The Exon-Florio Amendment: A Solution in Search of a Problem by Greidinger, Marc
American University International Law Review
Volume 6 | Issue 2 Article 1
1991
The Exon-Florio Amendment: A Solution in
Search of a Problem
Marc Greidinger
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/auilr
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Washington College of Law Journals & Law Reviews at Digital Commons @ American
University Washington College of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in American University International Law Review by an authorized
administrator of Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law. For more information, please contact
fbrown@wcl.american.edu.
Recommended Citation
Greidinger, Marc. "The Exon-Florio Amendment: A Solution in Search of a Problem." American University International Law Review
6, no. 2 (1991): 111-177.
ARTICLES
THE EXON-FLORIO AMENDMENT: A SOLUTION IN
SEARCH OF A PROBLEM
Marc Greidinger*
INTRODUCTION
On August 23, 1988, the president of the United States gained broad
authority to investigate and block mergers, takeovers, and acquisitions
that could result in foreign control of domestic companies. Congress
granted this authority as part of the Omnibus Trade and Competitive-
ness Act of 1988,' by enacting the Exon-Florio Amendment to Title
VII of the Defense Production Act of 1950.2 Congress passed the Exon-
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tant General Counsel for International Affairs and Intelligence of the United States
Department of Defense. The views expressed herein are solely those of the author. The
author takes full responsibility for the content of the text.
In preparing this article, the author relied in part on official government documents
which have not yet been made public. In order to publish this article in an unclassified
format, it was necessary to omit some citations to source materials.
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Law; Drs. Audrey Kurth Cronin and Steve Fetter, University of Maryland School of
Public Affairs; Michael Cifrino, United States Department of Defense; Dr. Catherine
Kelleher, Director of the Center for International Security Studies at Maryland; Chris-
topher McLean, Legislative Assistant to Sen. J. James Exon; Deans Michael Nacht
and Bill Powers of the University of Maryland School of Public Affairs; and the mem-
bers of the staff of The American University Journal of International Law and Policy
for their review, comments, and assistance with this article.
1. Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 721, 102 Stat.
1107 (1988) (to be codified at 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170); see also 137 CONG. REc. S2107
(daily ed. Feb. 21, 1991) (statement of Sen. Exon) (requesting an exemption for the
Exon-Florio Amendment from sunset provisions of the Defense Production Act of
1950).
2. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170 (1988).
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Florio Amendment (Exon-Florio or the Amendment) in response to a
surge in the rate of foreign takeovers of American firms that produce
high technology goods and services.
Several factors contributed to this increased takeover activity.
Favorable exchange rates allowed foreign investors to buy United
States assets cheaply.3 Foreign high technology firms, concerned that
the declining value of the dollar would make foreign imports too expen-
sive for American consumers, increased their acquisitions of American
high technology firms.4 By investing in United States production facili-
ties, foreign firms benefitted from the lower production input prices in-
side the United States and increased their profits as well as their mar-
ket share.'
This increased foreign direct investment in United States high tech-
nology assets received much political attention.6 Politicians made patri-
otic speeches that presented images of dramatic increases in sales of
the country's leading-edge industries. Congress also expressed senti-
ment that the United States should protect sensitive technologies from
military and economic competitors.8 Many felt that the United States
was growing too dependent on foreign sources for defense-related pro-
duction.' In addition, management in companies that were targets of
hostile takeover attempts clamored for protection. 10 In order to retard
erosion of the competitiveness of the United States in world markets
and to retaliate against the trade policies of foreign states, members of
Congress advocated blocking foreign takeovers.1
3. See 134 CONG. REc. S4833 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1988) (statement of Sen. Exon)
[hereinafter Exon Statement] (calling for a revamped investment policy to protect na-
tional security).
4. See infra notes 15-23 and accompanying text (setting forth the background and
legislative history of the Exon-Florio Amendment).
5. Production facilities in the United States give parent companies an added advan-
tage: greater access to American technological advances. Facilities in the United States
also help to deter the creation of import barriers.
6. See infra notes 112-23 and accompanying text (discussing the debates leading
up to the passage of Exon-Florio).
7. See, e.g., Federal Collection of Information on Foreign Investment in the U.S.:
Hearing Before the Comm. on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, 100th Cong.,
2d Sess. 5, 10 (1988) [hereinafter Federal Collection of Information on Foreign In-
vestment in the U.S.] (statements of Hon. Tom Harkin and Hon. John W. Bryant)
(advocating the implementation of foreign investment data provisions).
8. Infra notes 122-30 and accompanying text.
9. Federal Collection of Information on Foreign Investment in the U.S., supra note
7, at 3, 4, 10, 33, 74 (statements of Sen. McCain, Hon. Tom Harkin, Hon. John W.
Bryant, Sen. Pressler, and Dr. Susan J. Tolchin).
10. Infra notes 278-80 and accompanying text.
11. Infra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
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Finally, political forces pushed the control of foreign investment in
domestic high technology firms onto the congressional agenda 12 when
Fujitsu, a Japanese computer company, attempted to purchase
Fairchild Industries, a silicon valley semi-conductor manufacturer."3
Specific concerns regarding the national security implications of this
acquisition1 4 generated more discussions, revealing the fear that domes-
tic defense suppliers were becoming too dependent on the Japanese for
semi-conductors.' 5 In addition, many authorities feared that the Japa-
nese shared too much sensitive technology with Warsaw Pact nations.10
Moreover, by the end of 1987, total Japanese investment in the United
States had risen to $33.3 billion, a 195 % increase from the amount of
investments five years earlier. 17 The debate over the Fujitsu merger fu-
eled the larger controversy over rising Japanese investment in the
12. Comments of D. Mulford, The Association for Foreign Investment in America
and Bureau of National Affairs, Conference on Foreign Investment: The Economic
Perspective, Fed. News Serv., Oct. 6, 1988.
13. See 134 CONG. R.c. H2320 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1988) [hereinafter Florio
Statement] (statement of Rep. Florio) (using the Fujitsu merger as an example to cre-
ate a protective policy against foreign investment); see also Exon Statement, supra
note 3, at 54833 (calling for a protective policy in the wake of the Fujitsu merger).
14. Florio Statement, supra note 13, at H2320. Fairchild produced a number of
sophisticated electronic components used in aircraft, missile guidance, strategic defense
research, and supercomputers made for encryption and decryption. Woodruff, Huge
Japanese Holdings Prompt Concern About Economic Clout in US., The Sun, Jan. 15,
1989, at 8E. Domestic defense contractors that were in competition with Fujitsu de-
pended on Fairchild, the sole source of unique subcomponents necessary for fulfilling
defense contracts. See Hansan, The Regulation of Foreign Direct Im'estment in the
United States Defense Industry, 9 Nw. J. IN'L L. & Bus. 658, 670 (1989) (providing
a detailed account of the Fujitsu merger attempt). After the sale, the defense commu-
nity became concerned that Fujitsu would have economic incentives to curtail
Fairchild's production of subcomponents for firms with which Fujitsu competed. Wood-
ruff, supra, at 8E.
15. See New Omnibus Trade Law Said to Offer Weapon Against Foreign Take-
over Bids, Daily Rep. Exec. (BNA) No. 215, at A-4 (Nov. 7, 1988) (stating that
Fairchild was a subsidiary of the French holding company Schlumberger, Ltd.).
16. Charges against Toshiba Jumble Trade Bill Talks, Chicago Tribune, Mar. 20,
1988, (Business Section), at 3; Auerbach, CIA Says Toshiba Sold More to Soviet
Bloc, Wash. Post, Mar. 15, 1988, at Cl. The media's focus on the Toshiba-Kongsberg
sale of sensitive manufacturing technologies to the Soviet Union contributed to the con-
cern that Japanese control of firms such as Fairchild would result in more damaging
transfers of technologies to the Eastern Bloc. Id.
17. Woodruff, supra note 14, at 8E.
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United States,18 and politicians placed more importance on the issues
that such mergers raised.19
As a result of political pressure, Fujitsu dropped its acquisition plans.
Nevertheless, the debate made Congress aware that the president did
not have adequate authority to block the Fairchild acquisition, unless
he resorted to invoking emergency powers.10 Exercise of emergency
powers, however, would have caused a diplomatic crisis with Japan,21
18. See Schlender & Yoder, Chip Makers See New Threat from Japanese Firms:
Fujitsu's Plan to Merge with Fairchild Stirs Concern, Wall St. J., Oct. 27, 1986, at 6
(reporting the slumping sales that weakened United States semiconducter manufactur-
ers, including Fairchild, making them desirable to the Japanese purchasers); see also
OFFICE OF JAPAN, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, JAPANESE INVESTMENT STRATEGY IN
THE UNITED STATES 1 (1983) (on file with The American University Journal of Inter-
national Law and Policy) (noting that Japan's government "to blunt foreign criticism
of Japan's current account surplus" encouraged Japanese firms to capitalize on these
opportunities by recycling accumulated capital).
19. See Schendler & Yoder, supra note 18, at 6 (relating the defense industry's
concern over Fujitsu's plan to purchase Fairchild).
20. See Florio Statement, supra note 13, at H2320 (testifying in support of the
Exon-Florio Amendment).
21. See Foreign Takeovers and National Security: Hearing on § 905 of H.R. 3
Before the Subcomm. on Commerce, Consumer Protection, and Competitiveness of the
House Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 17-18 (1988) [herein-
after Foreign Takeovers Hearing] (statement of J. Michael Farren, Deputy Under
Secretary for International Trade, Department of Commerce) (interpreting the Inter-
national Emergency Economic Powers Act [IEEPA], 50 U.S.C. § 1701, to give the
president authority to block foreign acquisition of Fairchild if it would be an extraordi-
nary threat to national security, foreign policy, or the economy); see also Acquisitions
by Foreign Companies: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and
Transportation, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1987) [hereinafter Acquisitions Hearing]
(statement of Sen. Pete Wilson) (equating a presidential decision to block a foreign
acquisition to a declaration of hostilities against the government of the acquiring com-
pany); see, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,205, 45 Fed. Reg. 24,099 (1980) (prohibiting cer-
tain transactions with Iran). The Reagan administration explored the possibility of
blocking the merger under United States antitrust laws. Alvarez, Political Protection-
ism and United States International Investment Obligations in Conflict: The Hazards
of Exon-Florio, 30 VA. J. INT'L L. 1, 61 (1989). The Department of Justice, however,
found no significant restraint of trade resulting from the merger. Id. Under applicable
antitrust law, the standards are the same for mergers involving foreign firms and merg-
ers between domestic companies.
The administration also explored the possibility of forging an agreement with Fujitsu
to guarantee that Fairchild would continue to produce semiconductor components used
in defense industries for a period of years. To this end, the agreement would set mini-
mum levels for capital investment in Fairchild's operations, research, and development.
In addition, Fujitsu would segregate Fairchild's sensitive technologies from the parent
corporation, and United States trustees would manage these technologies. In order to
enforce this agreement, the government would judge Fujitsu's efforts to fulfill its obli-
gations by a standard of "satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics" to deter-
mine whether the company is eligibile for government contracts. Federal Acquisition
Regulations, Title 48, 9.104-1(d) (1989). The merger fell through, however, before the




because application of the president's emergency powers would necessi-
tate labeling the Japanese acquisition of Fairchild an "extraordinary
threat."2 2 Further complicating the problem, a French holding com-
pany owned Fairchild at the time of the attempted acquisition, 23 raising
questions of whether the use of emergency powers would be appropri-
ate. A presidential move to prevent the sale of Fairchild to the Japa-
nese could signal a preference for European ownership, and result in a
trade war that would endanger American national security even more
than the attempted takeover.
Members of Congress active in the Fujitsu-Fairchild debate proposed
the Exon-Florio Amendment to govern transactions similar to the con-
tested Fujitsu merger attempt. The Amendment would act as an inter-
mediate measure to address less "unusual and extraordinary" threats
than the threats that emergency powers laws address. The Amendment
would also apply in circumstances where existing law is not "adequate
and appropriate"2 4 for the president to use in response to national se-
curity concerns.
The Exon-Florio Amendment25 empowers the Committee on Foreign
Investment in the United States (CFIUS)26 to investigate "mergers,
acquisitions and takeovers [that could result in] foreign control of per-
22. International Emergency Economic Powers Act [IEEPA], 50 U.S.C. § 1701
(1988).
23. See Wilson & Dryden, What the Fairchild Fiasco Signals for Trade Policy,
Bus. WK., Mar. 30, 1987, at 28 (discussing the French owners' negotiations for sale of
Fairchild); see also Schlender & Yoder, supra note 18, at 6 (explaining that although
Schlumberger, Ltd. is based in New York, many consider it a French company).
24. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(2) (1988).
25. For full text of the Exon-Florio Amendment see the appendix following this
article.
26. See Exec. Order No. 11,858, 54 Fed. Reg. 779 (1989) (delegating primary
responsibility for implementing Exon-Florio to CFIUS). CFIUS is an interagency
group created in 1975 to "review investments in the United States, which, in the judg-
ment of the Committee might have major implications for the United States national
interests." Exec. Order No. 11,858, 40 Fed. Reg. 20,263 (1975), as amended by Exec.
Order No. 12,188, 45 Fed. Reg. 989 (1980), and Exec. Order No. 12,661, 54 Fed.
Reg. (1989). The Secretary of the Treasury is the chairperson of CFIUS. Id. CFIUS'
members include the Secretaries of Defense, Commerce, and State, the United States
Trade Representative, the Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors, the Attor-
ney General, and the Director of the Office of Management and Budget. Id.; see also
Treasury Fully Implementing National Security Provision, Brady Says, Daily Rep.
Exec. (BNA) No. 246, at 4-11 (Dec. 22, 1988) (detailing the composition of CFIUS).
Before the enactment of Exon-Florio, CFIUS had no legal authority to block foreign
direct investments. Id. CFIUS review has resolved national security problems arising
from a transaction, however, either through negotiation with the parties to the transac-
tion or by referring them to the appropriate executive department. See Foreign Take-
overs Hearing, supra note 21, at 20-22 (statement of David C. Mulford, Assistant
Secretary for International Affairs, Department of Treasury) (providing examples of
recent successful CFIUS causes).
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sons engaged in interstate commerce in the United States. ' 27 After an
27. 50 U.S.C. § 2170(a) (1988). The Defense Production Act does not define the
terms "merger," "acquisition," "takeover," and "control." Id.
The proposed regulations adopt the same loose definitions of "merger," "acquisi-
tion," and "takeover" as those used under antitrust laws. See 54 Fed. Reg. 29,744,
29,746-47 (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. § 800) (proposed July 14, 1989) (stating that
the term "acquisition" is shorthand for mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers) [hereinaf-
ter Proposed Treasury Regulations]; C. HILLS, ANTITRUST-TRUST ADVISOR 163 (3d
ed. 1985) (asserting that these terms are often used interchangeably under antitrust
law to refer to a wide variety of transactions bringing previously independent enter-
prises together). There are other "transfers," such as a partial stock acquisition, which
transfers less than total control, or an operating lease, which transfers less than abso-
lute interest. Id. at 164; see also United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F.
Supp. 153, 181-82 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (stating that acquisition terms are not precise
terms of art but rather are broad, imprecise words covering many types of
transactions).
Although clearly defining mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers may be difficult, the
legislative history does exclude some transactions from their definition. For example,
the original House bill would have made joint ventures and licensing arrangements
subject to review. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 924 (1988) [here-
inafter CoNF. REP.]. Opponents criticized this language because it could hinder the
transfer of foreign technologies to the United States. See Foreign Takeovers Hearing,
supra note 21, at 75-79 (statement of Robert MoNeill, Executive Vice-Chairman,
Emergency Committee for American Trade) (stating that regulations under the Export
Administration Act and Arms Control Act would protect sensitive technologies under
these types of arrangements). Consequently, Congress excluded joint ventures and li-
censing arrangements from the statute's provisions. CONF. REP., supra, at 925.
The proposed regulations, however, do define joint ventures that result in foreign
acquisition of a United States firm as "acquisitions" subject to the provisions of Exon-
Florio. Proposed Treasury Regulations, supra, at 29,748, 29,752. Technically, one
could argue that a definition of "mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers" that includes
joint ventures frustrates congressional intent as revealed by the legislative history.
CONF. REP., supra, at 925. Without this regulatory provision, however, foreign entities
might attempt to disguise acquisitions as joint ventures. Thus, CFIUS may argue for
the inclusion of joint ventures under its authority to issue regulations in order to pre-
vent subversion or contravention of the purposes of the statute. See CONF. REP., supra,
at 926 (acknowledging that Congress intended to interpret the term "national security"
broadly). Corporate control is also difficult to define. See Gottesman v. General Mo-
tors, 279 F. Supp. 361, 367 (S.D.N.Y. 1967) (asserting that "corporate control" in-
cludes the power to direct policy, exact patronage, and influence decisions and member-
ship of boards of directors). The specific purpose of the law is to determine the degree
of proof needed to reject or accept the inference of control. Id. at 368.
Administrative precedent exists for stringent definitions of the term "control." See
16 C.F.R. § 801.1(b) (1990) (defining control as ownership of 50% or more of the
voting stock in the corporation, or the right to at least 50 % of the corporate profits or
assets in the event of dissolution, or the contractual power to designate 50% or more of
the corporation's directors). But see Gottesman, 279 F. Supp. at 368 (finding control
where one block owned 23 % of a firm with scattered ownership of the remaining
shares). In this situation, the owner of the minor block often has the capacity to control
corporate policy through the use of proxy machinery while the majority of sharehold-
ers, who have bought shares exclusively for investment purposes, remain inert. Id.
Under Exon-Florio, the government would investigate stock acquisitions before the
parties could establish any command relationship. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2166(a) (1988).
The government does not have to prove, therefore, that the entity exercises control. See
Proposed Treasury Regulations, supra, at 29,752 (including coverage of proposed ac-
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investigation, if the president discovers "credible evidence'2 28 demon-
strating that the foreign interest might take action "that threatens to
impair the national security" 29 of the United States and that other pro-
visions of law are not "adequate and appropriate" 30 in dealing with the
threat, then the president is authorized to "take such action for such
time as [the president] considers appropriate to suspend or prohibit"31
the transaction.
quisitions). Instead, the Exon-Florio "control" standard requires that the foreign entity
would have the potential power to exercise control if the government approved of the
acquisition. Id. In line with the foreign relations purpose of Exon-Florio's and the De-
fense Production Act's foreign relations purpose, CFIUS applies a concept of control
without making strict percentage calculations of assets or equity; CFIUS determines
the practical distribution of power over corporate policy. Id. at 29,751. This concept
takes into account the size of the interest acquired as well as the distribution of remain-
ing assets and equity not involved in the transaction. Id.
A definition of "control" that does not focus on percentages of ownership provides
flexibility, permits responsiveness to individual circumstances, and has significant policy
advantages. Providing a baseline percentage of equitable ownership necessary for for-
eign "control," however, would enhance uniformity and certainty for foreigners invest-
ing in the United States. The Federal Trade Commission is currently considering pre-
merger notification rules that would require acquisition of 10% of the voting stock in a
corporation before the Commission could activate reporting requirements under the
Hart-Scott-Rodino Act. 16 C.F.R. § 801.3 (1990). Regulations for implementing
Exon-Florio could adopt similar concepts. See 54 Fed. Reg. 29,751 (advocating non-
numeric standards for "control").
Drafters must construe these regulations carefully. If, for example, regulations ex-
empt a party from Exon-Floria when it acquires less than 10% ownership of a corpora-
tion, then ownership could be spread out over several foreign "persons" to avoid the
reach of the legislation. At the same time, if regulations require Exon-Florio filings
every time there is an acquisition after which foreign persons own over 10% of the
voting stock, extremely small foreign investments would be subject to the Exon-Florio
process. Other terms within the regulations, meanwhile, may reduce the flexibility
gained from such a standard of "control." Id. For example, the term "parent" in the
proposed regulations contains a very rigorous mechanical test that may override this
flexibility. See id. (requiring a 50% test as the standard for determining ownership).
28. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d) (1988).
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Id. § 2170(c). This broad language is significant because if the courts deter-
mine that the statute authorizes the president's action, then the president's motives,
reasoning, findings of facts, and judgment are immune from judicial scrutiny. See
United States Cane Sugar Refiners' Ass'n v. Block, 683 F.2d 399, 404 (C.C.P.A. 1982)
(holding that where statutes authorize the president's actions the judiciary plays no
role). This is a well-established principle in United States law. See also Martin v.
Mott, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 19, 31-32 (1827) (explaining that no one may limit the
president's actions once the law authorizes action).
Courts have interpreted corresponding language in subsection 232(b) of the Trade
Act of 1962 which authorizes the president to "take such action.., he deems neces-
sary" to adjust imports that threaten the national security, so that the president has
discretion "in broadest terms." Pancoastal Petroleum, Ltd. v. Udall, 348 F.2d 805, 807
(D.C. Cir. 1965). In Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, 426 U.S. 548 (1976),
the Supreme Court held that although section 232 did not expressly grant the president
the power, the president could use his discretion in taking unilateral action under sec-
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The Amendment gives the president a tremendous amount of discre-
tion to block foreign acquisitions. As of this writing, President Bush has
tion 232 to include imposing tariffs, as well as quotas, on whole classes of imported
goods. Id. at 570. The similarities between Exon-Florio and section 232 suggest that
such discretion also exists in section 2170. Hence, section 2170 might allow the presi-
dent to unilaterally impose licensing fees or taxes on foreign companies that acquire
United States firms or quantitative quotas on foreign direct investment.
Notable differences exist, however, in the scope of actions contemplated under sec-
tion 232 and those that Exon-Florio authorizes. For example, under subsection 232(b),
the objective of presidential action is to "adjust imports." 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c) (1988).
The president makes these adjustments not on a firm-by-firm or case-by-case basis, but
on an article-by-article basis, and therefore, the president's decision binds all firms in-
volved with importing the good and its derivatives. See Algonquin, 426 U.S. at 554-56
(discussing whether to impose a duty on all firms importing petroleum and petroleum
products). Under Exon-Florio, both the language of the statute and the legislative his-
tory contemplate a case-by-case review of each acquisition. See CONF. REP., supra note
27, at 925 (discussing the requirement that the president find evidence of proposed or
pending transactions). Nothing in the text of Exon-Florio or the legislative history,
however, prevents the president from promulgating a policy either through practice or
formal declaration that requires uniform treatment of all transactions involving firms
with certain characteristics. As a result, the president's authority to block mergers
under Exon-Florio is at least as broad as the authority granted to block imports under
section 232 of the 1962 Trade Act. See Nance & Wasserman, Regulations of Imports
and Foreign Investments in the United States on National Security Grounds, 11
MICH. J. INT'L L. 926, 968 (1990) (noting that the statutory scheme that authorizes
the president to act under provisions of section 232 is analogous to Exon-Florio).
If the holding in Algonquin applies to Exon-Florio, then the statute grants tremen-
dous power to the president to intervene unilaterally in the international investment
arena, but with some outer limits to presidential authority. See Algonquin, 426 U.S. at
571 (holding that although the president may raise license fees on imported oil, the
statute does not permit "any action the president might take, as long as it has even a
remote impact on imports") (emphasis in original); see also Independent Gasoline
Marketers Council, Inc. v. Duncan, 492 F. Supp. 614, 618 (D.D.C. 1980) (holding that
section 232 cannot support a conservation fee imposed on imported oil because its ef-
fects are too remote to reduce consumption). Three factors supported the determination
in Independent Gasoline Marketers Council, Inc. v. Duncan: (1) the slight impact of
the conservation fee on import levels, (2) the broad controls the conservation fee im-
posed on domestic goods to achieve that slight impact, and (3) indications that the
president attempted an "end-run" around a Congress that refused to pass legislation
directly authorizing a gasoline conservation tax. Id. If section 232 applies to Exon-
Florio, this holding would not authorize the president to take actions for general regu-
lation of mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers, in either international or purely domestic
transactions. Nevertheless, the statute would permit presidential actions having an inci-
dental effect on domestic investment.
The legislative history demonstrates that the suspension and prohibition power of
section 232 is not contingent upon securing a court order but instead requires a presi-
dential announcement within 15 days of the conclusion of an investigation. CONF. REP.,
supra note 27, at 927. The statute also authorizes the president to direct the attorney
general to seek appropriate relief in the United States district courts in order to imple-
ment and enforce Exon-Florio. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(c) (1988). Congress intended
"appropriate relief" to be a broad term that allows the president flexibility to respond
to different circumstances. See CONF. REP., supra note 27, at 927 (allowing the presi-
dent to act against any national security threat a foreign takeover may pose). Through
the courts, the attorney general may seek equitable, including injunctive, relief. Id.
Divestment relief power is subject to the 15 day limitation, and the executive may
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used his powers under the law to block transactions on only two occa-
sions. In both cases he indicated that concern about transfers of sensi-
tive weapons technologies motivated his actions.32 There is, however, no
guarantee that the government will restrict its use of the Exon-Florio
Amendment to this limited purpose in the future.o Moreover, future
administrations that are less committed to open investment may con-
sider using Exon-Florio to advance different policy goals.
Another problem with the Amendment is that it contains terms that
are left open to interpretation. For example, the term "national secur-
ity" is not defined in the Amendment.3 4 In addition, Congress specifi-
cally exempted from judicial review determinations of what constitutes
"credible evidence" and whether other provisions of law are "adequate
and appropriate" to protect national security.3 5
Such vague terms in the statute reflect unresolved congressional de-
bate on the proper construction and implementation of the Amend-
ment. Those advocating the delegation of broad powers to the president
often have divergent notions of what the term "national security" cov-
ers and envision use of the Amendment's provisions for a large variety
exercise it only in the case of takeovers concluded after the enactment of the Omnibus
Trade Act of 1988 and after notification of CFIUS. Id.
The attorney general has interpreted the phrase "such action" in subsection 232(b)
to mean a continuing course of action, so that once the government imposes restric-
tions, it is not required to find a new threat to national security in order to change the
type of restrictions. Restriction of Oil Imports, 43 Op. Att'y Gen. 3, 3 (1975). Simi-
larly, under Exon-Florio, once the president suspends a foreign acquisition for national
security reasons, the executive need not make new findings to continue a suspension of
activity or change it to a prohibition. CoNF. REP., supra note 27, at 925. CFIUS
should monitor developments to assess the need for changes or continuation of restric-
tions but need not comply with the procedural and timing requirements for initial in-
vestigations and findings. Id.
32. See Farnsworth, U.S. Stops Japanese Acquisition: Officials Oppose Sale of
General Ceramics for Security Reasons, N.Y. Times, Apr. 18, 1989, at DI (reporting
that the president temporarily blocked Tokuyama's proposed purchase of General Ce-
ramics); see also A. Rosenthal, Bush, Citing Security Law, Voids Sale of Aviation
Concern to China, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1990, at Al (reporting that President Bush
voided the sale of an aviation concern to China for national security reasons).
33. Foreign Acquisitions and National Security: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Consumer Protection and Competitiveness of the House Comm. on Energy
and Commerce, 101st Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1990) (statement of Michael Skarzynski).
At the oversight hearing on the implementation of Exon-Florio, a Commerce Depart-
ment representative advocated an all-encompassing definition of national security. Id.
"National security," he stated, "is ultimately dependent on economic strength and vi-
tality." Id.
34. See Nance & Wasserman, supra note 31, at 968 (explaining the absence of a
definition for national security in the Exon-Florio Amendment).
35. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d) (1988).
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of purposes.8 6 Others, however, anticipate using the provision only for
defense related purposes in attempts to block the "hemorrhage" of crit-
ical military techologies to unfriendly states.3 7 Such groups aim to pre-
vent "Libyans in three-piece suits"38 from destroying the military in-
dustrial base of the United States through takeovers of American firms.
Others place a more economic focus on "national security" and advo-
cate using the legislation to address the "devastation" of competitive-
ness of the United States in world markets.39 This group would also use
the Amendment to address the difficulty of achieving a reciprocal trade
policy.40
In the United States business community, commentators have ex-
pressed concern that the ambiguity of the national security standard
could lead to unpredictable application of the Amendment. 41 Some au-
thorities have expressed the fear that those advocating the aggressive
use of Exon-Florio may stretch the Amendment's purpose just as law-
yers creatively apply the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organi-
zations Act to prosecute activity bearing little resemblance to tradi-
tional "organized crime."'42
Such uncertainty concerning whether the government will interfere
with an acquisition could inhibit transactions and prevent the most pro-
ductive use of economic resources.43 Consequently, many parties have
requested that the executive branch specify circumstances where it will
restrict foreign investors' acquisitions.44 The executive branch, however,
has resisted enacting policies that limit the president's ability to deal
with unforeseeable situations.
36. Nance & Wasserman, supra note 31, at 968-73 (discussing the broad interpre-
tation of national security).
37. See Acquisitions Hearing, supra note 21, at 42-43 (statement of Sen. Riegle,
Jr.) (lambasting the United States' debt).
38. See id. at 24 (statement of Robert Mercer, Chairman of the Board and Chief
Executive Officer, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.) (speculating that a enemy of the
United States might use means more cost effective than war to destroy the United
States).
39. See id. at 10 (statement of Sen. Exon) (decrying the condition of United States
competitiveness in the world market).
40. See id. at 13 (statement of Sen. Breaux) (detailing methods other countries use
to investigate foreign investors).
41. Schumacher, The Exon-Florio Amendment: From Enactment to Practice, 10
INvEsTmENT U.S.A., No. 12, at 19, 21 (Dec. 1988).
42. Id.
43. See 134 CONG. REc. H2321 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1988) (statement of Rep.
Craig) (discussing the Exon-Florio Amendment's negative effect on American
businesses).
44. Nance & Wasserman, supra note 31, at 972 n.205 (describing comments sub-




This article challenges the premise that it is necessary for the presi-
dent to maintain unfettered discretion to block international transac-
tions under the Exon-Florio Amendment in order to preserve the na-
tional security of the United States. Part I explores the scope of
presidential authority to define what constitutes a national security
problem under the Exon-Florio Amendment. Part II demonstrates that
law outside of the Amendment is both "adequate and appropriate" to
handle threats to national security interests that may arise as a result
of a foreign acquisition. Part III discusses international agreements
that prevent use of the Exon-Florio Amendment to protect economic
interests affecting national security. Part IV explores how implementa-
tion of the Exon-Florio Amendment could minimize the uncertainties
that distort the free flow of capital in international investment markets
and how the provision could supplement existing law that protects na-
tional security.
I. THE NATIONAL SECURITY STANDARD
The term "national security" is a critical component of the Amend-
ment's statutory construction. "National security" appears several
times in the Exon-Florio provision to define its parameters, to describe
the standard of review, and to identify essential points for the exercise
of executive discretion in applying the law.4 Neither the Exon-Florio
Amendment, the Defense Production Act, nor the regulations imple-
menting the law, however, define "national security."'0
Congress intentionally left "national security" undefined in order to
provide the president with broad discretion to evaluate threats and to
take appropriate measures in response to them. 7 By leaving the term
undefined, Congress did not intend to grant the president carte blanche
45. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(a) (1988). The statute provides that the purpose of in-
vestigation is to determine "the effects on national security" of mergers, acquisitions,
and takeovers of United States firms by foreign entities. Id. In order to suspend or
prohibit these activities under the statute, the president must first find that "there is
credible evidence that leads [the president] to believe that the foreign interest exercis-
ing control might take action that threatens to impair the national security ... ." Id. §
2170(d)(1). Second, the president must find that other provisions of law do not "pro-
vide adequate and appropriate authority for the president to protect the national secur-
ity ... ." Id. § 2170(d)(2). The president must evaluate "requirements of national
security" when determining the factors to consider in applying the statute. Id. §
2170(e). United States capacity to meet those requirements is among the factors that
Congress suggests the president may consider. Id. § 2170(e)(3). Finally, the objective
of the president's actions under the statute should be to ensure that foreign control
"will not threaten to impair the national security." Id. § 2170(c).
46. Proposed Treasury Regulations, supra note 27, at 29,746.
47. CoNF. REP., supra note 27, at 926.
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to interfere with foreign direct investment in the United States. 48 Con-
gress provided little guidance, however, to indicate what limitations it
did intend to place on the president. The following section explores the
text of the statute as well as the legislative history to determine the
nature and limitations of presidential power under Exon-Florio.
A. STATUTORY CONTEXT
1. Factors for Application of Exon-Florio
Subsection 2171 (e) of the Exon-Florio Amendment provides the only
explicit guidance given to the president for applying the national secur-
ity standard.49 It details three factors that the president "may" con-
sider "among other factors" when the president applies the provision.50
The first factor allows consideration of "domestic production needed
for projected national defense requirements." 1 With this provision,
Exon-Florio amends the Defense Production Act definition of national
defense to include "programs for military and atomic energy produc-
tion or construction, military assistance to any foreign nation, stockpil-
ing, space, and directly related activity. 52 In this context, "projected
national defense requirements" could involve both future peacetime
needs and potential mobilization requirements in the event of war.
Thus, the first factor addresses the maintainance of an adequately pre-
pared military industrial base.
The second factor that is listed in subsection 2170(e) is "the capabil-
ity and capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense re-
quirements, including the availability of human resources, products,
technology, materials, and other supplies and services .. .8 This pro-
vision considers the availability of capital, labor, and material inputs
necessary for the maintenance of a sound industrial defense base.5 The
inputs listed, however, are used not only in defense industries, but are
also used in the non-defense sectors of the economy. 5  Hence, interven-
tion to preserve these industrial inputs could occur in response to over-
all trends in the domestic economy, as well as to threats to inputs spe-
cific to certain defense production."
48. Id.
49. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e) (1988).
50. Id.
51. Id. § 2170(e)(1) (emphasis added).
52. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2152(d) (1988).
53. Id. § 2170(e)(2) (1988).
54. Id.
55. CONF. REP., supra note 27, at 927.
56. Id.
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The third factor listed in subsection 2170(e) that the president may
examine is "the control of domestic industries and commercial activity
by foreign citizens as it affects the capability and capacity of the
United States to meet the requirements of national security."17 Al-
though this language is general, it does incorporate the national secur-
ity standard. Under the rule of ejusdem generis, because these general
terms follow words that have a specific meaning in subsection
2170(e)(1)-(2), the non-specific words in subsection 2170(e)(3) should
apply only to factors of the same general "kind or class" as the preced-
ing subsections."8
The general words in this section, however, include the national se-
curity standard and, therefore, make it impossible to interpret the enu-
merated factors in subsection 2170(e) as limitations on the national se-
curity standard. By including ambiguity in subsection 2170(e)(3) and
the conditional language in the opening sentence of subsection 2170(e),
Congress suggests that the executive should consider other factors that
implicate national security concerns beyond those specified in subsec-
tion 2170(e). Analysis of the statutory origins of the national security
standard reinforces this contention."
2. Similarity to the Trade Expansion Act of 1962
Much of the language in the Exon-Florio Amendment resembles lan-
guage in subsection 232(b) of the 1962 Trade Expansion Act. Subsec-
tion 232(b) provides that if the secretary of the Treasury Department
finds an "article is being imported into the United States in such quan-
tities or under such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national
security," 60 the president may take action "to adjust the imports of
[the] article and its derivatives so that ... imports [of the article] will
not threaten to impair the national security."8 Subsection 232(c) of
the Trade Expansion Act provides the president with a list of factors to
consider when implementing subsection 232(b) that includes the fac-
tors enumerated in subsection 2170(e) of Exon-Florio.0 2
No federal cases have addressed directly the scope of the national
security standard in subsection 232(b) of the Trade Expansion Act. In
dicta, however, the Supreme Court has remarked that, in subsection
57. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e)(3) (1988).
58. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 47.17 (4th ed. 1984 &
Supp. 1990).
59. 19 U.S.C. § 1862(b) (1988).
60. Id.
61. Id. § 1862(c).
62. Id. § 1862(d).
1991]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
232(b), national security is a "narrower criterion [which] stands in
stark contrast [to a] broad ... national interest" 3 standard. Neverthe-
less, the Court implicitly recognized that increased foreign competition
and its long term potential to retard the maintenance, development,
and expansion of domestic production of natural resources necessary to
protect national security interests fell fairly within the domain of na-
tional security." It is then reasonable to assume that Congress bor-
rowed language from section 232 because it viewed the effect of foreign
direct investment on national security as similar to the effect of foreign
imports. It is also reasonable to assume then that in adopting the lan-
guage of section 232, Congress intended to apply the national security
standard in a manner similar to its application in section 232.
3. Purposes of the 1988 Trade Act
Congress enacted the Omnibus Trade Act of 1988 to strengthen
United States trade laws, improve the development and management of
United States trade strategy, and, through these actions, improve
global living standards.6 5 The legislation also contains findings that out-
line problems related to productivity and competitiveness of American
firms and industries, the international monetary system, and the condi-
tion of the domestic economy.6 6 Under this Act "the highest priority of
the United States government"6 7 is the pursuit of policies "to prevent
future declines in the U.S. economy and standard of living, [and] ...
to guarantee the continued vitality of the technological [and] industrial
base[s] of the United States."68 Because courts often interpret statutes
in light of their overall purposes, 9 courts could interpret the Trade Act
to support a broad economic definition of national security.
63. Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 569 (1976).
The Court also contrasted the "more limited authorization" of the national security
standard with the "open-ended nature" of criteria based on "public policy, or interest
served and other pertinent facts." Id. at 559-60 n.10.
While the national security standard of Exon-Florio appears narrower than the "na-
tional interest" standard, some may interpret the standard to apply to the potential for
foreign competition to harm the long-term productive capacity of domestic defense in-
dustries because the language in the two statutes is analogous.
64. Id. at 562-63.
65. 19 U.S.C. § 2901 n.(b) (1988).




69. See Consumers Union of United States, Inc. v. Kissinger, 506 F.2d 136, 141
(D.C. Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1004 (1975) (finding the purpose of the Trade
Expansion Act of 1962 to be stimulation of United States economic growth and expan-
sion of foreign markets for United States products).
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B. THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF EXON-FLORIO
1. Judicial Use of the Legislative History of the Exon-Florio
Amendment
Traditionally, courts have recognized foreign policy as an area of
"executive discretion in which the judiciary is ill equipped to inter-
vene."'70 Because the Exon-Florio Amendment involves matters of for-
eign affairs, the judiciary will be reluctant to exercise discretion and to
attribute probative meaning to ambiguous or conflicting historical in-
formation. While the executive branch may use legislative history and
secondary materials to craft policy under the Amendment, exercise of
the executive's interpretive powers must satisfy basic principles of legis-
lative intent.71 Where the legislative history fails to show that a partic-
ular statutory construction is contrary to the will of Congress, for pur-
poses of judicial review, courts often view the expressed legislative
intent as mere recommendations, and not as absolute directives to the
president. 2
Further, Exon-Florio specifically exempts subsection 2170(d) from
judicial review.73 The House-Senate conference report advises that the
limitation on judicial review applies only to subsection 2170(d).74 It is
possible, therefore, that all matters are reviewable, except for the exis-
tence and credibility of evidence of the anticipated national security
threat and the question of whether there is judicial authority to take
action under other law.7 5
Courts are reluctant to exercise jurisdiction over matters of foreign
policy because they lack judicial expertise, capacity, and constitutional
70. See Hayes, The Boland Amendment and Foreign Affairs Deference, 88
COLUM. L. REv. 1534, 1535 (1988) (describing this approach as foreign affairs defer-
ence). Foreign affairs deference alters the substantive mechanics of statutory interpre-
tation by applying a highly deferential review of the application of law to facts, and the
approach defers to the executive's interpretation of statutes absent a clear statement of
contrary legislative intent. Id. at 1538-40. In foreign affairs, the courts are reluctant to
curb activities of the political branches and have developed "special doctrines of defer-
ence to them." L. HENEiN, FoREIGN AFFAiRS AND Tm CoNsTrrurtoN 81-84 (1972).
Courts assume ambiguity in the statutory language is a purposeful delegation of inter-
pretive power to the executive. Id.; see also Zemel v. Rusk, 381 US. 1, 17, reh'g
denied, 382 U.S. 873 (1965) (holding that the executive's broad rulemaking powers are
valid under the Passport Act of 1926 because of the executive's authority over matters
of foreign affairs); Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981) (affirming the executive's
rulemaking powers under the Passport Act of 1926).
71. Hayes, supra note 70, at 1538-40.
72. Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221, 233-34
(1986).
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authority to handle these disputes.76 It would be impossible for the ju-
diciary to review a proposed merger's threat to national security with-
out making judgments about national security requirements, as well as
forecasts regarding future developments in foreign affairs. These deter-
minations involve resolution of factual and policy issues that are tradi-
tionally considered outside of the judiciary's capacity because the judi-
ciary lacks expertise, standards, and an adequate discovery process to
resolve such matters.7 Moreover, a court would have difficulty resolv-
ing national security standard disputes without expressing disrespect
towards the authority of coordinate branches of government.7 8 For
these reasons, courts could rule that these issues are non-justiciable po-
litical questions and defer to the determinations of the executive .7 Al-
though many commentators heavily criticize the political question doc-
trine, "the doctrine continues to have a 'pervasive influence' on foreign
affairs cases."8' 0
In line with the doctrines of political question and foreign affairs def-
erence, the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) exempts all adjudica-
tive determinations from its procedural rules to the extent that they
involve "the conduct of military or foreign affairs functions."81 This
exemption includes the requirement that adjudicative decisions contain
a statement of findings, conclusions, and rationale, as well as provisions
for appeal.8 2 Because the Exon-Florio Amendment is part of the De-
fense Production Act, 3 it would appear to be exempt under section
2159 of the APA. 4 Congress repealed and replaced that provision of
the APA,8 5 however, with an entirely new version in 1966.88 A private
litigant might then argue that the special exemption for the Defense
76. See Chicago & S. Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111
(1948) (holding that Civilian Aeronautics Board orders pertaining to presidential-ap-
proved certificates for overseas or foreign transportation are discretionary executive
matters not subject to judicial review).
77. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962) (delineating when a political
question is exempt from judicial review).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Hayes, supra note 70, at 1547-48 (citations omitted).
81. 5 U.S.C. § 554(a)(4) (1988).
82. Id. § 557(c). Despite a nexus to foreign affairs, under subsection 554(a)(4), the
decisionmaker arguably has a duty to provide "a brief statement of grounds for denial"
under subsection 555(e). Nicholson v. Brown, 599 F.2d 639, 648 n.9 (5th Cir.), modi-
fied, 605 F.2d 209 (1979).
83. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2061 (1988).
84. 50 U.S.C. § 2159 (1982). This section provides for continued operation of the
APA's earlier section 3 version. The Freedom of Information Act now contains provi-
sions similar to this section. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1988).
85. Administrative Procedure Act, ch. 324, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) (codified as
amended at 5 U.S.C. § 551 (1988)).
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Production Act refers to provisions in the repealed APA, rather than
the provision presently in force. Hence, litigants would argue that they
enjoy procedural protection under the current APA. Some speculate
that parties may attempt to block takeovers through application of
APA mechanisms that would allow appeals from CFIUS decisions to
impede urgent court rulings.87 Even if courts hold that the APA ap-
plies, however, a private litigant can derive only minimal procedural
protection.
The judiciary relies on legislative history when the terms in statutes
are imprecise. When the legislative history is ambiguous, the courts
pay less attention to historical information." There are significant rea-
sons, however, to consider any expression of congressional intent even
when the legislative history is unclear. While professing to defer to the
executive's interpretation of statutes involving foreign affairs, courts
sometimes scrutinize legislative histories in order to "confirm" that the
president's interpretation is reasonable.80 Occasionally, courts refer to
the legislative history when overturning executive actions "contrary to
manifest Congressional intent" 90 that involve statutes concerning na-
tional security.91 Moreover, executive exploitation of minor statutory
ambiguities to subvert the intent of legislation angers Congress. This
then encourages Congress to engage in micromanagement of foreign
policy and to promulgate far more specific statutory language than is
actually necessary. 2 Annual reauthorization of the Defense Production
Act93 provides Congress with an excellent opportunity to add more pre-
86. Pub. L. 89-554, 80 Stat. 632 (1966) (codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-
559 (1988)).
87. New Foreign Trade Law Said to Offer Weapon against Foreign Takeover Bids,
Daily Rep. Exec. (BNA) No. 215, at A-4 (Nov. 7, 1988).
88. SINGER, supra note 58, at § 48.02. Justice Jackson articulated this principle:
When we decide from legislative history, including statements of witnesses at
hearings, what Congress probably had in mind, we must put ourselves in the
place of the majority of Congressmen, and act according to the impression we
think history should have made on them .... That process seems to me to be not
the interpretation of a statute, but the creation of a statute.
United States v. Public Utils. Comm'r, 345 U.S. 295, 319 (1953) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
89. See Japan Whaling Ass'n, 478 U.S. at 234-40 (citing the Pelly Amendment's
legislative history in holding that the certification standard does not unconditionally
require the Secretary of Commerce to certify each departure from international conser-
vation program limits); see also Hayes, supra note 70, at 1543 (referring to the deci-
sion in Japan Whaling).
90. Independent Gasoline Marketers Council, Inc. v. Duncan, 492 F. Supp. 614,
621 (D.D.C. 1980).
91. Id. at 620 n.10.
92. Hayes, supra note 70, at 1555.
93. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2166 (1988).
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cise language to the Exon-Florio provision. Thus, if the executive
branch adopts an interpretation clearly inconsistent with congressional
intent, Congress can narrow the scope of executive discretion each time
it reauthorizes the provision.
The legislative history of the Exon-Florio Amendment provides little
insight into the meaning of the term "national security." However, an
examination of the circumstances leading up to the introduction of the
Amendment, the actions taken and statements made during the legisla-
tive debate, and the post-enactment history provide some evidence of
legislative intent.9
2. Legislative History
a. Conference Committee Materials
The report of the conference committee that resolved differences be-
tween the House and Senate versions of the Amendment is the most
persuasive source of background information on Exon-Florio.95 For the
purpose of statutory construction, courts afford floor statements of con-
ference committee members that explain committee actions the same
weight as conference committee reports.98 These sources provide some
support for the contention that Congress intended to limit the breadth
of the executive's discretion to decide what constitutes a threat to na-
tional security.
In the original House of Representatives version, section 2170 au-
thorized the president to consider not only threats to national security,
but also the effects of a foreign takeover on "essential commerce and
economic welfare" in deciding whether to exercise powers of suspension
and prohibition. 7 This version also contained a detailed list of addi-
tional factors for presidential consideration that closely paralleled the
language of subsection 232(c) of the Trade Expansion Act.98 The crite-
94. SINGER, supra note 58, at § 48.01.
95. See SINGER, supra note 58, at § 48.06-.08. In attempting to construe an ambig-
uous term such as "national security," usually the courts turn first to the history of the
Act's passage. Id. § 48.04. This provides a rough method by which to determine the
relative probative weight of various sources of information in the legislative history that
courts can apply to interpret the national security provision in Exon-Florio.
96. Id. § 48.14.
97. CONF. REP., supra note 27, at 924-25.
98. See Text of Amendment to HR 3, Omnibus Trade Bill, as Approved March
18, 1987 by House Energy and Commerce Subcommittee on Commerce, Consumer
Protection and Competitiveness, and Staff Memorandum Explaining Amendment,
Daily Rep. Exec. (BNA) No. 52, at M-1 (Mar. 19, 1987) (setting forth the House
version of Exon-Florio, which virtually tracked subsection 232(c) of the Trade Act ex-
cept that "national security and essential commerce" was substituted for "national se-
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ria for review in the Senate provision were "national security or essen-
tial commerce which relates to national security."DO
The conference agreement later removed all references to "essential
commerce" and "economic welfare" and narrowed the list of factors
that the president could consider to the more limited language of sub-
section 2170(e).100 Further, the report states that the conferees "in no
way intend[ed] to impose barriers to foreign investment,"' 0 1 nor did
they plan to effect "transactions which are outside the realm of na-
tional security." 02 These modifications indicate that Congress inter-
preted the words national security to exclude some of the policy areas
that the terms essential commerce and economic welfare encompass.
This supports the inference that Congress intends Exon-Florio to apply
to cases that primarily involve national defense rather than economic
concerns. A reasonable interpretation of section 2170 would give effect
to these changes in the statutory language.
Beyond the inferences drawn from modifications Congress made to
statutory language, nothing indicates what constraints Congress in-
tended to impose on defining the concept of national security. In fact,
the conference report places primary emphasis on removal of limita-
tions on the national security concept. The report notes that Congress
intended to construe the term national security broadly "without limi-
tation to particular industries."'' 0 3 The statute authorizes the president
to take action "in any industry... provided that the facts and circum-
stances warrant the Presidential findings required under this provi-
sion."1 4 The statute explains that the factors listed in subsection
2170(e) guide the president's national security determinations, but are
not intended to be exclusive, and that the president may expand these
factors either through regulations or on a case by case basis.'0 5 The
statute further notes that the term "national defense," as used in sub-
section 2170(e), has been "correctly interpreted in the past to include
curity" and "control of industries by foreign citizens" was substituted for "foreign
competition" and "excessive imports").
99. CoNF. REP., supra note 27, at 925.
100. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e) (1988) (outlining factors for the president to
consider). These factors are: (1) domestic production needed for national defense, (2)
capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense needs, and (3)
foreign citizens' control of domestic industries needed to meet national security require-
ments. Id.
101. CoNF. REP., supra note 27, at 926.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 906.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 927.
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the provision of a broad range of goods and services, as well as techno-
logical innovations and economic stabilization efforts."106
Senator Exon and Congressman Florio, the chief sponsors of the
measure, echoed and expanded the conference report's application of a
broad definition to the concept of national security.0 7 Furthermore,
both sponsors asserted that the Fujitsu case, involving the semiconduc-
tor industry, is exactly the type of policy problem that the provision
should address.108 Both Congressmen indicated that the concept of na-
tional security extends beyond defense industries.108 National security,
for example, would extend to new and emerging technologies, biomedi-
cal and health-related innovations, and other goods or services where
the loss of domestic control could threaten national security.110 Na-
tional security also could include the maintenance of sufficient plant
equipment, technology, research and development, new and manufac-
tured materials, stockpiles and weapons to protect the nation's health,
safety, welfare, and defense."'
b. Committee Hearing Sources
The Exon-Florio hearings clarify Congress' intent to give the presi-
dent authority to act when controversies similar to the Fujitsu-
Fairchild merger arise.11 2 According to Congressman Florio, part of the
impetus for the legislation related to the type of concern Secretary of
Commerce Malcolm Baldridge expressed to members of the Senate
committee.11 Florio stated:
[W]hen this whole Fujitsu situation evolved... there was a deficiency of author-
ity in the Government to take the appropriate controls if it was determined that
this was a problem for national security .... Conceivably you could talk about a
takeover that was not involving itself [sic] with a monopolistic situation or even a
restraint on trade. Nevertheless, it would still constitute a potential detriment to
our critical commerce areas that might be related to national security.11'
106. Id. at 926-27.
107. Exon Statement, supra note 3, at S4833; see Florio Statement, supra note 13,
at H2320 (affirming the conference report's broad approach to national security in floor
statements).
108. Exon Statement, supra note 3, at S4833; Florio Statement, supra note 13, at
H2320.
109. Exon Statement, supra note 3, at S4833; Florio Statement, supra note 13, at
H2320.
110. Florio Statement, supra note 13, at H2320.
111. Id.
112. Foreign Takeovers Hearing, supra note 21, at 25-27 (statement of Rep.
Florio).




Florio indicated that members in Congress believed there was a void in
the arsenal of protective devices for these situations."" When testifying
for the bill before the House Committee on Rules, Baldridge suggested
that the administration may have lacked the ability to follow through
on an effort to block the Fujitsu-Fairchild merger." 0 Florio asserted
that Exon-Florio would give the president the authority to act under
circumstances like the Fujitsu-Fairchild merger." 7 Many in Congress
and the administration were shocked to discover that the president had
so little authority under existing law to respond if foreign takeovers
threaten national security."18
Despite this call for broader economic protections, there is support in
the congressional hearings for the notion that Congress envisioned limi-
tations on the concept of "national security." Congressman Florio
noted in committee hearings that they did not construct the original
version of the measure to be a "protectionist initiative ... designed to
keep out investments.""19 Senator Exon emphasized that the national
security standard "was much more tightly drawn"' 20 than the national
interest standard that previously guided CFIUS deliberations. Never-
theless, witnesses widely criticized the essential commerce and eco-
nomic welfare standards in these earlier versions as vague and ill-de-
fined . 21 The discretion these standards gave the president caused
concern that American companies might use the provision to influence
the executive branch to block or otherwise delay legitimate transactions
for reasons completely unrelated to national security.22 Allowing this
use would endanger the stability and predictability of the domestic in-
vestment climate and future economic growth. 23
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Florio Statement, supra note 13, at H2320.
118. Id.
119. Foreign Takeovers Hearing, supra note 21, at 28 (statement of Rep. Florio).
120. Acquisitions Hearing, supra note 21, at 11 (statement of Sen. Exon).
121. Foreign Takeovers Hearing, supra note 21, at 71 (statement of Richard B.
Leather).
122. Id. at 78 (statement of Robert L. McNeil).
123. See id. at 24, 71, 75, 78 (criticizing the factors listed for presidential consider-
ation in the House bill that would require foreign investors to discuss the effects of
investments on the industry's economic welfare, the number of jobs created or saved,
the amount of tax revenues the investment would generate, or the loss of job skills).
Commentators viewed this system as a rol-back to the principle of national treatment
for foreign investors and as an example of the type of governmental intervention
against which the United States has protested internationally. Id. at 18. "Legislation
designed to protect U.S. national security interests," in the words of one witness, "is
not an appropriate vehicle for competitors and targets of hostile takeovers to thwart
their competition." Id. at 78; see also Acquisitions Hearing, supra note 21, at 62
(statement of Robert L. McNeill, Emergency Committee for American Trade) (ad-
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Nevertheless, there is an absence of criticism in the hearing reports
of the president's authority under the measure to act when national
security is at stake. This indicates that during congressional debates,
the term national security had taken on a distinguishable and more
limited meaning than "essential commerce and economic welfare. 1 24
The elimination of the essential commerce and economic welfare provi-
sions, language that many hearing witnesses opposed, may indicate that
Congress intended to give effect to these witnesses' concerns.125
During the deliberations, Senator Exon stated that he offered the
Amendment to address "primarily military"1 26 interests. While Con-
gress did not assume that national security was an all-encompassing
concept, it is clear that legislators generally understood the term to in-
clude far more than national defense. Reagan administration witnesses
who testified during the debates explicitly rejected an exclusively mili-
taristic definition of national security and explained that CFIUS also
considers national security to include "the economic health and well
being of the American economy. "127 For example, administration wit-
nesses suggested that a merger that could lead to the formation of a
precious metals cartel would be a proper subject for CFIUS review,
even though the Department of Justice would probably analyze the
anti-competitive effects of this merger under the Hart-Scott-Rodino
Act. 1 28 In fact, the only source that appears to define national security
exclusively in terms of national defense is a July 1987 constituent
newsletter that Senator Exon prepared that refers to an early version of
the measure. 29 These off-the-record statements, however, do not have
any value in formal statutory interpretation.130
Aside from non-record statements, there are indications that the leg-
islation originally addressed technology transfer and defense industrial
base issues.131 By the time Congress issued the conference committee
dressing the fact that the president must declare a national emergency under IEEPA,
declarations that presidents are reluctant to make "because of the castigation that
might be involved toward other countries").
124. Foreign Takeovers Hearing, supra note 21.
125. Proposed Treasury Regulations, supra note 27, at 29,746.
126. Acquisitions Hearing, supra note 21, at 12.
127. Foreign Takeovers Hearing, supra note 21, at 27 (statement of J. Michael
Farren, Deputy Under Secretary for International Trade, Department of Commerce).
128. Id. at 32.
129. See Exon, Foreign Takeovers May Jeopardize National Security, Exon Di-
ary, July 13, 1987 (on file with The American University Journal of International Law
and Policy) (proposing to limit application of the Amendment to takeovers affecting
national security).
130. SINGER, supra note 58, at § 48.12.
131. See Florio, Florio Named Conferee on Nation's Trade Bill by House Speaker
Jim Wright, News Release, Aug. 7, 1987, at 2 (reporting that Congressman Florio
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report, however, statements about the purposes of the provision did not
emphasize the national security implications of technology transfers. 3 2
This shift in emphasis resulted from assurances of "administration offi-
cials" that export control laws and other legislation would be sufficient
to handle any technology transfer problems that might arise.233 These
assurances apparently led to the exclusion of provisions that covered
licenses for use of patented technologies and joint ventures from the
final version of the provision.134 There is no reference, however, to any
decision to exclude technology transfer issues from the reach of the
provision in the public record. As a result, the president might still use
the Exon-Florio Amendment to address technology transfer concerns
that other legislation does not cover.
C. THE "CREDIBLE EVIDENCE" REQUIREMENT
Some commentators assert that the Exon-Florio "credible evidence"
requirement, which must lead "the president to believe that a foreign
interest exercising control might take action that threatens to impair
the national security,"1 35 creates a substantial hurdle to the exercise of
executive discretion under the national security standard.130 For in-
stance, some have interpreted this to require evidence that directly im-
plicates the foreigner involved in the transaction or that otherwise
meets an objective standard for substantial materiality or persuasive-
ness.137 There is nothing in the statute or the legislative history, how-
ever, to indicate that the credible evidence requirement activates any
formal evidentiary standards.1 3
believes the problems encountered with Toshiba's sale of national defense technology to
the Soviet Union will recur if the country does not take steps to defend against foreign
takeovers that threaten national security).
132. See Exon Statement, supra note 3, at S4833 (stating that "certain industries
and technologies ... must remain under foreign control ... if the United States is to
maintain its national security"). It is difficult, however, to read into this remark any
specific intent with respect to technology transfer issues.
133. Telephone interview with Christopher McLean, legislative assistant to Sen.
Exon (Feb. 20, 1989); see also Acquisitions Hearing, supra note 20, at 5 (statement of
Malcolm Baldridge, Secretary of Commerce) (asserting that the Export Administra-
tion Act would prevent technology transfer problems).
134. Telephone interview with Christopher McLean, supra note 133; see Acquisi-
tion Hearings, supra note 20, at 6-7 (statement of Sen. Danforth) (asserting that a
"chilling effect on international capital flows" would occur).
135. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(1).
136. See Nance & Wasserman, supra note 31, at 972-73 (stating that the "credi-
ble evidence" requirement demands that the president "make a sophisticated calcula-
tion of both the actions of a specific person... and the effects of those actions upon the
national security of the States").
137. Id.
138. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d) (1988).
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One problem with requiring evidence is that predictions about par-
ties' future actions in international business and politics are speculative.
Reliable intelligence about hostile or potentially harmful intentions of
the foreigners initiating direct investment would be difficult to obtain.
In the Fujitsu-Fairchild case, for example, there was no evidence of
any plan to restrict or discontinue production of critical semiconductor
components used for national defense purposes.139 The merger raised
considerable national security concerns in Congress, however, because
Congress believed that the motivation to restrict production could exist
and that the Fairchild acquisition would create opportunities for anti-
competitive behavior. 140 It would be unreasonable to interpret the
"credible evidence" requirement in a way that prevents presidential ac-
tion in the type of case that motivated Congress to pass the Exon-
Florio provision.
The statutory requirement itself links the president's beliefs with evi-
dence and does not create a preponderance of the evidence standard.4
Use of the phrase "might take action"' 4' combined with an explicit
exemption of this subsection from judicial review' 4 3 indicates that Con-
gress intended to delegate broad discretion to the president to decide
what information is significant. Thus, requiring the president to demon-
strate more than conjecture about a potential national security threat
probably would constitute an unreasonable invasion of executive discre-
tion. The president then can satisfy the "credible evidence" require-
ment as long as it is reasonable to infer from the facts that a national
security risk exists.
D. SCOPE OF DIsCRETION UNDER THE STANDARD
According to statutory analysis, the national security standard takes
into account direct threats to the military industrial base and defense
preparedness. 44 Hence, the long term effects of foreign competition on
the availability of inputs for defense production, on the health of de-
fense industries, and even on the overall state of the economy of the
United States, may be within the realm of national security. Similar
139. See Hansan, supra note 14, at 670-74 (detailing the history of the Fujitsu-
Fairchild case).
140. See Alvarez, supra note 21, at 56 (discussing congressional focus on the
Fujitsu merger attempt).
141. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(2) (1988) (emphasizing that the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act gives the president adequate and appropriate author-
ity to protect national security).
142. Id.
143. Id. § 2170(d).
144. Id. § 2170(d)(1).
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language in section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act, however, suggests
that "national security" is more limited in scope than the "national
interest" standard.145 The further removed a policy concern is from de-
fense industrial base issues, the more it appears to belong in the
broader "national interest" domain. Nevertheless, linkage in the statute
between broad economic concerns and the health of the defense indus-
trial base make this distinction difficult to infer. It is necessary, there-
fore, to look at sources outside of the statutory language to understand
the national security standard.
The legislative history suggests that Congress intended to place limi-
tations on the president's discretion to define national security
threats.1 46 For example, as stated previously, Congress excluded some
policy areas involving essential commerce and economic welfare from
the national security definition. 47 This could support an argument,
therefore, that Congress intended Exon-Florio to apply to cases primar-
ily involving national defense rather than to cases of economic con-
cerns. Nevertheless, the main thrust of the legislative history is to con-
strue the term national security broadly to include more than national
defense.148 The imposition of the "credible evidence" requirement does
nothing to alter the breadth of presidential discretion. Congress' altera-
tion or exclusion of broader language in finalizing the law most likely
would not be sufficient to overturn a presidential decision to block a
takeover for non-military reasons provided that there is some nexus be-
tween the president's objective and national security.240 When other
legislation does not cover economic and technology transfer concerns,
the president may use Exon-Florio where there is a reasonable nexus to
national security.150 If the nexus is lacking, there may be a constitu-
tional challenge to the president's power to block the takeover. 15' Given
the variety of definitions of national security, however, it is difficult to
imagine a situation where the president could not find a nexus.
145. 19 U.S.C. § 1862 (1988).
146. Alvarez, supra note 21, at 77.
147. Id. at 76-77, 102.
148. Id. at 71-72.
149. Federal Energy Admin., 426 U.S. at 569.
150. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d) (1988).
151. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952) (finding
the president not constitutionally authorized to seize and operate a steel mill in the
name of national security).
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II. ADEQUACY OF OTHER PROVISIONS OF LAW
In order to exercise power under subsection 2170(d)(2), the presi-
dent must certify that provisions of law other than the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) 115 and Exon-Florio do not
"in the President's judgment provide adequate and appropriate author-
ity for the President to protect the national security. . . ...5 While
IEEPA gives the president broad discretion to regulate and block for-
eigners' acquisitions of United States firms,154 the president may hesi-
tate to declare a national emergency, as required in IEEPA proceed-
ings, 155 even if the merger implicates national security issues. Exon-
Florio serves as an intermediate measure to handle less "unusual and
extraordinary"15 6 threats than IEEPA contemplates. 5 7
No other laws of the United States besides Exon-Florio contain pro-
visions for restricting foreign direct investment that could damage the
economy. United States law does provide remedies, however, for trans-
actions that result in unreasonable concentrations of market power.158
There are specific statutory and regulatory provisions designed to pro-
tect traditional national security interests such as United States defense
industry preparedness and the security of key technologies.159 Sectoral
controls and laws prohibiting "trading with the enemy" also prevent
foreign direct investment which could threaten national security inter-
ests.160 Provisions covering export controls, protection of classified in-
formation, and defense industries, do not prohibit foreign direct invest-
ment, but instead prohibit foreign investors' actions that might impair
national security.161 Together, these provisions give the executive pow-
erful authority to address security concerns without resorting to Exon-
Florio.
152. See 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1988) (noting the permissible exercise of presidential
authority to protect national security).
153. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(2) (1988).
154. Id. § 1702(a)(1)(B); see also Acquisitions Hearing, supra note 21, at 34(statement of Sen. Breaux) (stating that the government has used the IEEPA to pre-
vent United States investment abroad, but it has never employed IEEPA to prevent
foreign investment in the United States).
155. 50 U.S.C. § 1701(a) (1988).
156. Id.
157. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(2) (1988).
158. See 15 U.S.C. §9 1, 2, 18, 45 (1988) (addressing unreasonable restraints of
trade).
159. See Trading with the Enemy Act, 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-44 (1988) (dealing






The antitrust provision used most frequently to regulate mergers, ac-
quisitions, and takeovers is section 7 of the Clayton Act.10 2 Section 7
prohibits acquisition of stock or assets where "the effect of such acqui-
sition may be [to] substantially lessen competition.... ."103 The govern-
ment has applied it to a variety of business arrangements such as
tender offers, joint ventures, and a number of asset acquisitions includ-
ing patents, patent licensing agreements, trademarks, and distribution
rights.' " The government also may challenge a merger under sections
1 or 2 of the Sherman Act,16 5 as either a restraint of trade or a monop-
oly or may initiate a challenge against a merger under section 5 of the
Federal Trade Commission Act as an unfair method of competition. 10
The legal standard for analyzing mergers under each of these statutes
is identical.167
Courts analyze major antitrust cases involving foreign acquisition of
United States "persons" in the same way they analyze mergers be-
tween two domestic firms.1 68 In situations where foreign firms with
large market power join forces with concentrated American industry,
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) or the Department of Justice
may intervene to prevent the new entity's market dominance.10 In re-
cent years, however, the government has relaxed enforcement of the
antitrust laws, particularly with respect to "vertical" and "conglomer-
ate" mergers.170
Some commentators suggest that the president might use Exon-
Florio in situations in which there is fear of foreign market concentra-
tion in the United States but when the government deems implementa-
tion of the Clayton Act inappropriate under the relaxed antitrust stan-
dards that now prevail.17 1 An executive policy decision not to exercise
162. HILLS, supra note 27, at § 3.03.
163. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
164. HILLS, supra note 27, at § 3.02.
165. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-2 (1988).
166. 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1988).
167. HILLS, supra note 27, at § 3.03.
168. See FUGATE, FoREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTI-TRUST LAws §§ 10.14,
10.17 (3d ed. 1982) (demonstrating similarities among cases of mergers between inter-
national firms and mergers among domestic companies).
169. Id. § 10.17 (quoting an address by R. McLaren entitled "Competition and
Foreign Commerce of the United States," at the College of William and Mary in Wil-
liamsburg, Va., Oct. 16, 1970).
170. HILLS, supra note 27, at § 3.01.
171. See Acquisitions Hearing, supra note 21, at 30-31 (statement of Joe Parkin-
son, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Micron Technology, Inc.) (emphasizing
the need to prevent foreign takeovers of United States corporations).
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its enforcement power under the Clayton Act, however, does not alter
the requirements for presidential certification under subsection
2170(d)(2) .172 Any concentration of market power resulting from a for-
eign acquisition that could "threaten to impair the national security"173
would also substantially lessen competition under the terms of the
Clayton Act. Even though the government may not invoke the Clayton
Act, that Act still provides the president with "adequate and appropri-
ate authority"17 4 to prevent threats to the national security from con-
centrated market power. Thus, the use of Exon-Florio for antitrust pur-
poses probably would violate subsection 2170(d)(2) certification
requirements. 17 5
B. EXPORT RESTRICTIONS
The Export Administration Act 178 and the Arms Export Control
Act 17 7 require validated licenses to export certain categories of techno-
logical information, equipment, arms and munitions abroad. Depending
on the sensitivity of the information involved, these restrictions may
apply to allies of the United States, as well as to proscribed destina-
tions such as the Soviet Union.1 78
An "export" may occur not only when there is a physical transfer of
technical data over national frontiers, but also at any time there is a
transfer of technical data, equipment, or materials to a foreign national
with the intent to export.1 79 Companies must have licenses in order to
transfer controlled technology to a foreign parent.180 During the acqui-
sition process, therefore, the statutes may require a company to seques-
ter its technical operations from the foreign parent.
These export restrictions, together with the sectoral controls outlined
below, are sufficient to inhibit the most damaging transfers of technol-
172. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(2) (1988).
173. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988).
174. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(2) (1988).
175. Id. §§ 2158-70. Some scholars (suggest that use of Exon-Florio in this manner
would cause OECD member states and other foreign countries to accuse the United
States of maintaining a double standard in antitrust law to prevent
foreign investment.).
176. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2401-13 (1988).
177. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (1988). The government enforces this Act pursuant to the
International Traffic In Arms Regulations. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.1-.25 (1989).
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2404(e) (1988).
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ogy and materials.181 The mere existence of a legal prohibition, how-
ever, may be insufficient to prevent acquisitions designed to facilitate
diversions of technologies critical to the military. Foreigners' efforts to
gain technological intelligence include the establishment of "front"
companies in non-communist countries that divert high technology
goods to proscribed destinations.1 82 Exon-Florio may provide a useful
tool to prevent the use of acquired companies by foreign governments
for intelligence purposes, and a means for the United States to gather
information about foreign intelligence operations.
C. DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL SECURITY PROGRAM
Under the Department of Defense Industrial Security Program
(DISP), the government may impose restrictions on defense contractors
subject to foreign ownership, control, or influence who are performing
classified contracts. 83 These limitations are set forth in Department of
Defense regulations enacted pursuant to the National Security Act of
1947.'1 If the government determines that foreign interests own five
percent or more of a firm's securities, hold significant positions within
the firm, have agreements, understandings, arrangements, or debts with
the firm, provide income to the firm,185 or have access to classified in-
formation, the government may deny a contractor's facility clear-
ance.' 86 This clearance is a prerequisite to the contractor's gaining ac-
cess to classified information and, therefore, to its ability to perform
classified contracts.
The government may allow clearance requirement exceptions if the
firm wishing to perform classified contracts meets certain criteria. The
DISP may require restructuring so that units performing sensitive work
181. See Acquisitions Hearing, supra note 21, at 5 (statement of Malcolm Bal-
dridge, Secretary of Commerce) (stating that the Export Administration Act sectoral
controls are firmly in place).
182. Transfer of Technology: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Investigations of
the Senate Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 277 (1984) (pre-
pared statement of Richard N. Perle, Assistant Secretary for International Security
Policy, Department of Defense).
183. 32 C.F.R. § 2-201(a) (1988). The Code defines a "classified contract" as "any
contract that requires or will require access to classified information by the contractor
or his employees in the performance of a contract." Id. § 1-201.34.
184. 50 U.S.C. § 401 (1988).
185. See Department of Defense Industrial Security Regulations, 32 C.F.R. § 2-
202 (1988) (noting that any income from a communist country is sufficient to activate
this clause but that a company must derive more than 10% of gross income from a
non-communist foreign source to bring it under the restrictions).
186. Id.
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are kept separate through a voting trust agreement.87 Such agreements
transfer legal stock title and all management prerogatives to an Ameri-
can board of directors in an irrevocable conveyance of foreign stock
owners' voting rights to the American proxy holders.28 8 The govern-
ment also may grant exceptions where foreign owners holding less than
fifteen percent of the voting stock agree not to interfere with policies
and practices related to performance of classified contracts, and as a
condition of continued work, do not contest denial of access to classified
information.8 9
The DISP is one of the most powerful tools available to the executive
branch for blocking mergers. 90 On several occasions, when firms en-
gaged in defense contracting became targets of takeover attempts, the
Department of Defense has invoked the DISP to classify sensitive tech-
nologies, or require production of important military products to take
place in the United States. 91 In some cases this caused foreign firms to
withdraw buyout offers. In other cases the DISP required new owners
to continue production of important military goods in domestic facili-
ties, and to reassign classified work to entities within the United States
which were not subject to foreign control.192 The DISP will provide
"adequate and appropriate" authority to deal with most mergers rais-
ing technology transfer concerns, making the use of Exon-Florio inap-
propriate in such cases. 3
187. See Hansan, supra note 14, at 667 (discussing the DISP voting trust agree-
ment procedure, which insulated United States facilities from foreign influence).
188. Id.; Pavelic & Lopatkiewicz, Federal Restrictions on Participation by Foreign
Investors in Defense and Other Government Contracts, in DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA BAR
MANUAL: FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: LEGAL ISSUES AND TECH-
NIQUES 295-96 (2d ed. 1978).
189. See Foreign Takeovers Hearing, supra note 20, at 17 (statement of J.
Michael Farren, Deputy Under Secretary for International Trade, Department of
Commerce) (explaining the security controls available under current DISP provisions).
These requirements are modified under Industrial Security Agreements with the
United Kingdom and Canada. 32 C.F.R. §§ 2-117(c), 2-201(c)(2) (1988).
190. Acquisitions Hearing, supra note 21, at 18 (statement of Malcolm Baldridgo,
Secretary of Commerce). See Pavelic & Lopatkiewicz, supra note 188, at 278 (provid-
ing a detailed discussion of Defense Industrial Security Regulations).
191. Foreign Takeovers Hearing, supra note 21, at 21-22.
192. See id. (statement of David C. Mumford, Assistant Secretary for Interna-
tional Affairs, Department of the Treasury) (cataloguing various CFIUS cases that
have resulted in modification or termination of various investment proposals).
193. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(2) (requiring the president to find that other
laws are not "adequate and appropriate" before implementing Exon-Florio).
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D. DEFENSE PRODUCTION ACT
Titles I and III of the Defense Production Act authorize the presi-
dent to require firms essential to the defense industrial base to accept
and perform contracts.' It is possible that, as a condition to granting
the contract, the president could require the firm to reject a merger,
acquisition, or takeover that would result in foreign control. Moreover,
if necessary for national defense, the Act allows the president to over-
ride foreign owners' decisions to ensure that production goals meet the
needs of national security.19 5 The Exon-Florio conference report states
that the provision should not diminish the extraordinary existing power
of the president to intervene in matters of defense production. 00
E. TRADING WITH THE ENEMY ACT
The Trading with the Enemy Act197 makes it illegal for anyone in
the United States to engage in any form of trade with an "enemy" 9 8
or an "ally of [an] enemy"' 9 of the United States during wartime
without a license from the president.200 This bars any enemy or enemy
ally from exercising control in or gaining financial benefit from any
previous holdings in domestic corporations, or from making investments
in the United States without presidential approval.201 The statutory
definition for the terms "enemy" and "ally of enemy" includes "any
individual, corporation, or other body resident in, or doing business
with residents of a nation with which the United States is at war, or
anybody, regardless of nationality, whom the president declares to be
within the term 'ally of enemy' .... ,
The Trading with the Enemy Act was the primary legislation
through which the president exercised emergency economic powers
before promulgation of the IEEPA.0 3 Congress amended the Trading
with the Enemy Act in 1977 so that the president could make use of its
provisions only during time of war, not simply through a declaration of
194. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2071, 2091 (1988).
195. Id.
196. CONF. RE'., supra note 27, at 926.
197. 50 U.S.C. app. § 1 (1988).
198. Id. § 3(a).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. See id. §§ 2-5 (describing the impetus behind the Trading with the Enemy
Act and its provisions).
202. Id. § 2.
203. Id. § 1.
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national emergency.2' The law as amended, however, allows the presi-
dent to continue trade sanctions and restrictions against countries that
were effective in 1977.205 Under the residual authority of the Trading
with the Enemy Act, prohibitions on stock transfers and other transac-
tions necessary for foreign investment still exist against North Korea,
Cambodia, Vietnam, and Cuba. 08
The United States has not declared war officially since World War
II. Consequently, the president has been unable to restrict foreign in-
vestment through use of the Trading with the Enemy Act. Should the
United States go to war or persons from the small group of countries
listed above try to acquire domestic companies, the government should
respond to hostile investments through the Trading with the Enemy
Act instead of Exon-Florio.20 7
F. SECTORAL CONTROLS
The United States Code contains several statutory provisions that re-
strict, limit, or regulate foreign investment in industrial sectors associ-
ated with national security. Each has a unique history, and they are
scattered throughout the Code. This section identifies sectoral controls
related to enterprises that raise the most important security concerns,
but does not detail all Code provisions that may affect transactions. 0 8
A number of sectoral control provisions involve communications. For
instance, the Communications Act of 1937 provides that corporations
may not hold licenses for the operation of radio stations that aliens
directly or indirectly control and sets capital stock percentage limits on
alien ownership and voting power.20 The statute authorizing the priva-
tization of Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT) forbids
foreign ownership of more than twenty percent of COMSAT's voting
204. Pub. L. No. 95-223, 91 Stat. 1625 (1977) (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C.
app. § 5(b)(1) (1988)).
205. Id. at 1625.
206. 31 C.F.R. §§ 500, 515 (1989).
207. 50 U.S.C. §§ 2158-70 (1988).
208. See Grimes & Williams, Limitations Imposed by the Constitution and Trea-
ties of the United States on the Treatment of Foreign Direct Investment, in DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA BAR MANUAL: FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN THE UNITED STATES: LEGAL
ISSUES AND TECHNIQUES 20 (2d ed. 1979) (discussing existing sectoral controls).
209. 47 U.S.C. §§ 310(a)-(b) (1988).
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stock.210 The law also prohibits foreign ownership or control of compa-
nies with telegraph or cable lines in Alaska. 1
Other sectoral controls address national security concerns involving
space assets and nuclear materials. The government may revoke li-
censes to operate private land remote-sensing-space systems212 for fail-
ure to meet any "terms, conditions or restrictions"213 that the Secretary
of Commerce imposes, or for failure to comply with "any national se-
curity concerns."2 4 In addition, the government may suspend or revoke
licenses granted to corporations for commercial space launch operations
if necessary to protect "any national security interest or foreign policy
interest of the United States."215 Further, the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission may not issue licenses for nuclear power production or the
handling of nuclear materials to any corporation "if the Commission
knows or has reason to believe it is owned, controlled or dominated by
an alien, a foreign corporation or foreign government."210 These stat-
utes would address expeditiously national security threats from foreign
investment involving atomic science or space activities. In addition,
sectoral controls regulate foreign ownership of significant interests in
industries that historically have raised important industrial base issues.
The Shipping Act of 1916,17 prohibits, in times of war and national
emergency, the transfer of a controlling interest in an American corpo-
ration that owns ships, shipyards, drydocks, ship-building, or ship-re-
pairing facilities to anyone who is not a citizen of the United States,
218
216. Id. § 734(d). This statute applies a 20% limitation on investment to persons
described in section 310(a). Id. Pub. L. No. 93-505, § 2, 88 Stat. 1576 (1974)
amended the Communications Act of 1934 subsection 310(a) (codified as amended at
47 U.S.C. § 310(a)). The amendment substituted language defining persons affected as
foreign governments and their representatives for language that also included aliens,
their representatives, and foreign-controlled corporations. Id. Title 47 of the United
States Code, subsection 310(b) now includes this language. There is nothing in the
record to indicate that Congress intended this amendment to affect the COMSAT in-
vestment restrictions. Indeed, the reshuffling of these categories appears to be a con-
gressional error. There is no case law prescribing the proper application of these re-
strictions. While this error exists, it remains unclear whether the COMSAT investment
restrictions apply to non-governmental foreign persons.
211. 47 U.S.C. § 17 (1988); see 40 U.S.C. §§ 781-82 (1988) (outlining transfer
provisions and national defense considerations for government-owned long-lined com-
munications within and to Alaska).
212. 15 U.S.C. § 4243(a)(1) (1988).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. 49 U.S.C. app. § 2609(a) (1988).
216. 42 U.S.C. § 2133(d) (1988).
217. 46 U.S.C. app. § 801 (1988).
218. See 42 U.S.C. app. § 802 (1988) (requiring that a corporation, partnership, or
association own a controlling interest in the company to be a citizen of the United
States).
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unless the Secretary of Transportation approves the transfer.2 9 Also,
the aeronautics industry excludes foreign controlled corporations from
military aircraft, aircraft parts and accessory design competitions, and
places foreign controlled corporations at a substantial competitive
disadvantage. 220
Other sectoral controls directed at economic and policy goals beyond
the military context could apply to national security issues. For exam-
ple, there are specific statutory restrictions on foreign acquisitions of
air carriers that focus more on safety and competition concerns than on
national security issues.2 21 They could apply, however, to security issues
such as military airlifts, smuggling, or terrorism. In addition, countries
that do not allow United States citizens to hold public land leases for
exploitation of mineral resources may not benefit from stock holdings
or control of leases that permit mining of United States lands.22 En-
forcement of this provision could increase if there is a shortage in de-
fense-related minerals.
Historically, the government of the United States has chosen to pro-
tect national security interests through specific sectoral controls rather
than through broad sweeping statutes such as Exon-Florio. 228 The in-
ternational business community derives certainty from a regulatory
scheme that reflects an effort to define which industrial sectors are par-
ticularly sensitive and that designs procedural mechanisms for foreign
investment in these industries.224 Presently, key trading partners of the
United States rely on similar sectoral controls in their own bodies of
law to ensure that investment in their countries remains consistent with
their own national security interests. 225 Reservations in existing inter-
219. 46 U.S.C. app. § 835(b) (1988).
220. 10 U.S.C. § 2272(f) (1988).
221. 49 U.S.C. § 1378(a)(4) (1988).
222. 30 U.S.C. § 181 (1988).
223. See Acquisitions Hearing, supra note 21, at 5 (statement of Malcolm Bal-
dridge, Secretary of Commerce) (observing that many laws grant the president author-
ity to act to protect national security).
224. See id. at 48 (statement of Richard Darman, former Deputy Secretary of
Treasury) (stating that overly-broad language may alienate foreign trading partners).
225. OFFICE ON JAPAN, OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRE3TARY FOR INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY, DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, JAPANESE INVESTMENT POL-
ICY 1 (1983) (on file with The American University Journal of International Law and
Policy) (noting that Japan restricts foreign investments for security reasons in broad-
casting, telecommunications, aviation, rail transportation, and electric utilities, and pro-
hibits foreign entry in the manufacture of biologics, narcotics, arms, and munitions).
Japanese sectoral controls extend to protect economic interests in areas such as agricul-
ture, forestry, fisheries, mining, leather, and petroleum manufacturing and marketing.
Id.; see generally, Crabb, The Reality of Extralegal Barriers to Mergers and Acquisi-
tions in Japan, 21 INT'L LAW. 97 (1987); Reynolds, Foreign Investment in Japan: The
Legal and Social Climate, 18 TEx. INT'L L.J. 175 (1983).
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national agreements, moreover, recognize United States domestic
sectoral controls, thereby reducing the likelihood that their use could
create diplomatic tension.2"'
G. Ti STRENGTH OF OTHER EXISTING LAW
Before the enactment of Exon-Floro, existing law resolved merger
and acquisition national security concerns to the satisfaction of the
United States government, and no president had ever needed to invoke
emergency powers.227 The Defense Production Act addressed all
threats to the domestic industries' ability to meet emergency defense
needs,228 while sectoral controls limited foreign participation in key in-
dustries. Antitrust laws prevented the formation of foreign controlled
monopolies in industries important in meeting defense needs. Export
control laws, the Defense Industrial Security Program, and some
sectoral controls prevented secrets and sensitive technologies from fall-
ing into the wrong hands when corporate ownership changed. The
Trading with the Enemy Act precluded acquisitions by the most threat-
ening adversaries. 229 Before Congress passed Exon-Florio, most in the
executive branch believed existing laws and regulations were sufficient
to handle threats from foreign direct investment.230 Experience had
demonstrated that existing law would be inadequate only in rare
situations.
Congress, however, does not limit use of Exon-Florio to situations
where other law is inadequate. Use of the word "appropriate" in sub-
section 2170(d)(2) gives the president discretion to decide whether to
invoke Exon-Florio when considering a problem acquisition. Moreover,
presidential determinations under this subsection are not subject to ju-
dicial review.231 Given the increasing interest in restricting foreign in-
vestment, former methods of resolving national security issues may not
be indicative of future trends in this area.
226. ORGANIZATION FOR ECON. COOPERATION AND DEV., CODE OF LMERAUZA-
TION OF CAPITAL MOVEMENTS, Annex B: Reservations to the Code on Liberalization of
Capital Movements, at 96 (1986) [hereinafter CAPITAL MOvEMENTS CODE].
227. See Foreign Takeovers Hearing, supra note 21, at 18 (statement of J.
Michael Farren, Deputy Under Secretary for International Trade, Department of
Commerce) (stating that the the Exon-Florio Amendment would discourage foreign
investment).
228. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2061 (1988).
229. 50 U.S.C. app. § 1 (1988).
230. See Acquisitions Hearing, supra note 21, at 5 (statement of Malcolm Bal-
dridge, Secretary of Commerce) (asserting that other existing law would serve the
same ends as the Exon-Florio Act).
231. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d) (1988).
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IV. TREATY OBLIGATIONS
Subsection 2170(h) of Exon-Florio provides that the executive
branch should not construe the provision "to alter or affect any existing
power ... provided by any other provision of law. '23 2 In its discussion
of this subsection, the joint conference committee explained that "the
Conferees do not intend to abrogate existing obligations of the U.S.
pursuant to treaties, including Treaties of Friendship, Commerce, and
Navigation."233 Congress intended to restrict the president's application
of Exon-Florio to uses consistent with the commitments of the United
States under international law.234 The United States is a party to nu-
merous bilateral treaties and agreements that contain clauses prohibit-
ing barriers to international investment. 35 These treaties govern invest-
ment relationships with the United States' most important allies and
largest trading partners. 36 To explain the effects of treaties on Exon-
Florio, this section uses several important examples: Friendship, Com-
merce, and Navigation (FCN) Treaties, and the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD) Capital Movements
Code.
A. LEGALLY BINDING TREATIES: FCN
Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation (FCN) treaties are among
the most common and the most important bilateral treaties prohibiting
barriers to international investment that the United States has entered
into in the post-World War II period.237 They establish a basic frame-
work for relations in a number of areas including international invest-
ment. The United States-Japan FCN, for example, gives parties from
both countries "national treatment with respect to engaging in all types
232. Id. § 2170(h).
233. CoNF. REP., supra note 27, at 927.
234. Id. Immediately following discussion of the effect of international obligations,
the conference report notes that "[t]he normal rules of statutory interpretation govern
this section." Id.; see Grimes & Williams, supra note 208, at 20 (noting well-estab-
lished United States jurisprudence that recognizes valid treaties and agreements over
prior inconsistent federal law).
235. Data File: Treaties Establishing Most Favored Nation or National Treat-
ment Status (Results of search of all unclassified treaties in computer database, Office
of the Assistant. General Counsel for International Affairs and Intelligence, United
States Department of Defense, Washington, D.C., May, 1989) (on file with The Amer-
ican University Journal of International Law & Policy); see Alvarez, supra note 21, at
112 n.607 (discussing the extent of United States trading partners' foreign investment
screening authority).
236. Id.
237. See Grimes & Williams, supra note 208, at 21 (estimating that the United
States has entered into 130 FCN treaties with foreign states).
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of commercial, industrial, financial and other business activities within
the territories of the other Party,... [including permission] (b) ... to
acquire majority interests in companies of such other Party .... I' In
this context, "national treatment" affords foreign companies the same
right to acquire interests in domestic companies that other United
States companies enjoy.2 39 Other treaties provide most-favored-nation
treatment to the entities within foreign states.2 0 Thus, foreign compa-
nies from a signatory nation have the same right to purchase interests
in domestic companies that the United States grants to the companies
of any third country. The distinction disappears, however, if the United
States affords "national treatment" to any third country in this context
because it must give similar treatment to the signatories of treaties con-
taining most-favored-nation clauses.2" 1
Most FCNs and related treaties contain standard exemptions cover-
ing defense production and the essential security of parties.4 2 The
United States-Nicaragua FCN, for example, provides that:
[t]he present Treaty shall not preclude the application of measures:...
(c) regulating the production of or traffic in arms, ammunition and implements
of war, or traffic in other materials carried on directly or indirectly for the pur-
pose of supplying a military establishment;
(d) necessary to fulfill the obligations of a Party for the maintenance or restora-
tion of international peace and security, or necessary to protect its essential se-
curity interests; ...
Nations could invoke these exceptions in order to give less favorable
treatment to foreign investors in situations that threaten national secur-
ity or defense production. Depending on the language of the treaty,
assertion of an "essential security interest" might be sufficient to escape
treaty provisions that bar restrictive investment practices. The General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade244 does not prevent any party from
taking action that the party "considers necessary for protection of its
238. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Apr. 2, 1953, United
States-Japan, art. VII(l), 4 U.S.T. 2063, 2069 [hereinafter FCN-Japan].
239. Id. art. XXH, at 2079.
240. See Alvarez, supra note 21, at 16-56 (providing a detailed analysis of interna-
tional investment obligations of the United States).
241. Id. (discussing United States policy of rejecting reciprocity in trade invest-
ment agreements).
242. E.g., United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff In Teheran, 1980 I.CJ.
Pleadings Ann. 50, 235.
243. Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1956, United
States-Nicaragua, art. XXI l(c)-(d), 9 U.S.T. 449, 465 [hereinafter FCN-Nicaragua].
244. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947,
61 Stat. 5, 6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT].
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essential security interests. .." The OECD Code of Liberalization of
Capital Movements contains similar language.248 Other treaties, how-
ever, including the Japan and Nicaragua FCNs provide for "neces-
sary" measures, but do not allow parties to escape from their obliga-
tions by simply declaring that they consider it necessary.
Under most FCNs, parties submit their disputes to the International
Court of Justice (ICJ).24 18 The ICJ has jurisdiction to resolve cases
where treaty language does not specify that the parties may decide
what is necessary to protect their essential security interests.24 9 In Nic-
aragua v. United States,250 the government of Nicaragua charged that
the United States had violated its obligations under a bilateral FCN by
imposing a trade embargo and mining Nicaraguan harbours. The ICJ
applied a reasonableness standard to determine the level of risk to es-
sential security interests and to evaluate "whether the measures
presented as being designed to protect these interests are not merely
useful but 'necessary.' "251 Applying this standard, the ICJ found that
the United States could not justify a trade embargo or other actions 22
as necessary to protect its essential security interests253 and declared
that the United States had breached its obligations under the United
States-Nicaragua FCN.25
The United States refused to recognize the ICJ's jurisdiction over
the issues presented in the Nicaragua case and refused to comply with
the unfavorable judgment.2 5 Non-compliance was possible because the
president arguably has power under the United States Constitution to
245. Id. art. XXI(b) (emphasis added).
246. CAPITAL MOVEMENTS CODE, supra note 226, art. 3, at 14.
247. E.g., FCN-Nicaragua, supra note 243, at 465; FCN-Japan, supra note 238,
at 2079.
248. E.g., FCN-Nicaragua, supra note 243, at 467; FCN-Japan, supra note 238,
at 2080.
249. See Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 116-
17 (Judgment June 27) (finding the activities of the United States to violate interna-
tional law).
250. Id.
251. Id. at 117.
252. Id. at 22. Nicaragua also claimed that the United States participated in the
mining of Nicaraguan ports and acts of sabotage against ports and oil installations. Id.
253. Id. at 309 (Schwebel, J., dissenting).
254. Id. at 148. This occurred despite the president's finding that "the policies and
actions of the Government of Nicaragua constitute[d] an unusual and extraordinary
threat to the national security and foreign policy of the U.S.," when he imposed a trade
embargo under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. Exec. Order No.
1253, 50 Fed. Reg. 18,629 (1985).
255. See Reisman, Has the International Court Exceeded its Jurisdiction?, 80 AM.




take measures contrary to the terms of the treaty.2 56 Further, both Nic-
aragua and the ICJ lacked adequate mechanisms to enforce the judg-
ment against the United States.
In a case arising under Exon-Florio, however, the terms of the stat-
ute circumscribe the president's power to take action contrary to treaty
obligations of the United States257 and express congressional intent.283
Moreover, if a president's actions exceed the authority granted under
Exon-Florio and cause harm to private parties, injured parties can seek
relief in United States district courts.259 This Exon-Florio language
limits the executive's ability to abrogate treaty obligations considerably
more than the IEEPA does.
Neither United States courts nor the ICJ have ever articulated stan-
dards to determine when international investments threaten the "essen-
tial security interests" of a state that is a signatory to a FCN or similar
treaty. Courts are not likely, however, to adopt a standard that renders
treaty obligations meaningless. If a transaction threatens general eco-
nomic interests, courts most likely would rule that the proper remedy is
to withdraw under the termination provisions of the treaty.00
B. LEGALLY ESCAPABLE TREATIES: THE OECD CAPITAL
MOVEMENTS CODE
The OECD Capital Movements Code" 1 is one of the most significant
international investment agreements allowing states to determine for
themselves when they consider their essential security interests
threatened. Under the multilateral treaty creating the OECD, the
United States recognized "that the further expansion of world trade is
one of the most important factors favouring the economic development
of countries and the improvement of international economic relations
256. See Henkin, International Law as Law in the United States, 82 MiCH. L.
REv. 1555, 1569 (1984) (stating that the president "can denounce a treaty when he
deems it in the national interest to do so, even when such denunciation is a breach of
international law"). If the president acts in this manner, the United States is responsi-
ble for the breach of international law, but the treaty is no longer law in the United
States. Id. at 1568.
257. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(h) (1988).
258. CoNF. REP., supra note 27, at 927.
259. See id. at 925 (stating that only the actions of the president under subsection
1(d) are exempt from judicial review).
260. See Inter-American Convention on Treaties of 1928, art. 17, reprinted In E.
PUSCHXE, INTERNATONAL RElAnrors: BASic Doctumrs (1953) (describing the con-
clusion of treaty-making).
261. CAPirrA MovmiENns CODE, supra note 226.
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" . .,262 Accordingly, the United States agreed to pursue efforts "to
reduce or abolish obstacles to the exchange of goods and services...
and extend the liberalization of capital movements .. . ."-3 These ef-
forts have included taking the lead in the promulgation of the Code of
Liberalization of Capital Movements and subsequent negotiations on
international investment practices.
26
Analysis of provisions concerning protection of the essential security
interests of signatories must take into consideration the entire scheme
of the Code. All members adhering to the Code26 5 agree to "progres-
262. Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development,
Dec. 14, 1960, Preface to Treaty, 12 U.S.T. 1728, 1731, T.I.A.S. No. 4891, 888
U.N.T.S. 179 [hereinafter OECD Convention].
263. Id. art. II(d), 12 U.S.T. 1728, 1733.
264. See Richardson, United States Policy Toward Foreign Investment: We Can't
Have It Both Ways, 4 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & PoL'Y 281, 291, 299 (1989) (discussing the
United States' leading role in negotiating for the liberalization of investment practices
among nations).
265. See OECD Convention, supra note 262 (listing members of the OECD).
Members of the OECD are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland,
France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Lux-
embourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Id. As of March 1982, only
Canada had not agreed to adhere to the Convention. Id.
Although Canada is not a party to the Convention, the United States-Canada Free-
Trade agreement dictates national treatment for investors between the United States
and Canada with respect to acquisition of business enterprises, divestiture prohibitions,
and minimum ownership prohibitions. Canada-United States Free-Trade Agreement,
art. 1602, reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 2, 374 (1988). The agreement requires substantial
changes in Canada's investment screening provisions and provides for a progressive in-
crease in the gross asset threshold for foreign acquisitions in Canada. Id. Annex
1607.3. The parties expect this agreement to reduce obstacles to the free flow of capital
into Canada. The agreement is monumental because foreign investors already control
40% of Canada's manufacturing capacity. See Foreign Takeovers Hearing, supra note
21, at 16 (statement of J. Michael Farren, Deputy Under Secretary for International
Trade, Department of Commerce).
Subsection 2170(h) does not permit use of Exon-Florio to block an acquisition from
Canada because it would violate the terms of the agreement. Moreover, it would give
Canada reason to derogate from the investment provisions in the treaty-a develop-
ment that would seriously disadvantage the United States, which enjoys high levels of
direct investment in Canada. Id. Provisions of the agreement, however, do not apply to
measures affecting government procurement investments or the provision of transporta-
tion services. United States-Canada Free Trade Agreement, art. 1601, para. 2. Use of
Exon-Florio for defense production along with application of most sectoral controls,
therefore, would not violate the terms of the agreement.
By its terms, subsection 2170(h) only applies to any "existing" power under any
provision of law, and the conference report discusses only "existing" United States in-
ternational obligations. CONF. RE'., supra note 27, at 927. The government could ar-
gue that this statutory restriction only applies to treaties in effect at the time of the
passage of Exon-Florio. The United States-Canada agreement did not enter into force
until January 1, 1989, four months after passage of the Amendment. Nevertheless, the
United States-Canada agreement, (a properly ratified treaty) supercedes prior inconsis-
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sively abolish ... restrictions on the movements of capital" 26 and "to
avoid introducing any new exchange restrictions on the movements of
capital or the use of non-resident owned funds and.., to avoid making
existing regulations more restrictive.126 7 Members specifically agree to
"grant any authorization required for the conclusion or execution of
transactions"'2 8 absent specific reservation, including direct investments
"which give the possibility of exercising an effective influence on the
management... in the country concerned by non-residents by means
of... acquisition of full ownership of an existing enterprise [or] partic-
ipation in a new or existing enterprise."26 The Code promotes foreign
direct investment so vehemently that the United States must specifi-
cally reserve the right to limit foreign direct investment through
sectoral controls. 7 ° Consequently, countries have used the Code to de-
ter broad national security restrictions on investments and to limit
sectoral controls.
Absent exceptional circumstances, use of Exon-Florio against a fel-
low OECD member would be a substantial departure from the interna-
tional norms that the Code established, despite the presence of the es-
sential security clause. It also would create negative consequences for
future domestic leaders who want to negotiate for more liberal foreign
investment laws. Policy, rather than obligation, would guide use of
Exon-Florio against the few foreign states that have not entered into
investment agreements with the United States. Most foreign direct in-
vestment in the United States, however, comes from nations with which
the United States has open investment agreements.7 1
If the United States uses the Exon-Florio Amendment to pursue
broad economic goals, it will conflict with most general investment
agreements. Further, where FCNs allow the ICJ to determine the exis-
tence of threats to a party's essential security interests, applying broad
economic definitions of national security under Exon-Florio probably
would breach the agreements, in direct violation of congressional in-
tent. With the OECD Capital Movements Code and similar agree-
tent federal law in accordance with established constitutional doctrine. Grimes & Wil-
liams, supra note 208, at 20.
266. OECD Convention, supra note 262, art. l(a).
267. Id. art. l(e).
268. Id. art. 2(a).
269. CAPITAL MOVEMENTS CODE, supra note 226, at Annex A: Liberalization Lists
of Capital Movements, List A, Part I, at 27.
270. Id. Annex B: Reservations to the Code of Liberalization of Capital Move-
ments, Part I, at 96.
271. See Alvarez, supra note 21, at 13 (emphasizing that the United States has
urged the elimination of foreign investment barriers); Richardson, supra note 264, at
291, 299 (describing the role of the United States in reducing investment barriers).
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ments that allow parties to determine for themselves what constitutes
essential security interests, resorting to Exon-Florio could completely
undermine the function of these agreements.
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS
Despite significant limitations on executive discretion, Exon-Florio
gives the president power to investigate, suspend, or prohibit acquisi-
tions in a wide variety of situations. Some business and policy leaders
advocate aggressive use of the legislation. They believe it can help solve
problems such as the "devastation" 27 2 of the ability of the United
States to compete in world markets, the need for a more reciprocal
trade policy,273 the export of critical defense technologies, 27 4 and the
specter of "Libyans in three-piece suits"'275 destroying the defense in-
dustrial base of the United States through participation in Wall Street
takeover deals.
There are important policy reasons for which the president should
refrain from using Exon-Florio to restrict acquisitions. The business
community has expressed concern that the ambiguity of the national
security standard could lead to its use in unpredictable circum-
stances.2 76 As previously noted, uncertainties about whether the govern-
ment will interfere with an acquisition inhibits transactions and pre-
vents the most productive use of available economic resources. The
executive branch, however, has resisted enacting regulations that would
limit the president's ability to handle unforeseeable security threats.2 78
272. Acquisitions Hearing, supra note 21, at 10 (statement of Sen. Exon).
273. Id. at 13 (statement of Sen. Breaux).
274. Id. at 42-43 (statement of Sen. Riegle, Jr.).
275. Id. at 24 (statement of Robert Mercer, Chairman of the Board and Chief
Executive Officer, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.).
276. See Schumacher, supra note 41, at 22 (noting that the multi-agency involve-
ment mandated by the statute could lead to uncertainty in the business community
about how each agency will interpret its provisions).
277. Id. Businesses cannot begin merger plans if an agency will oppose the transac-
tion a few months later. Id. Review by so many agencies also increases the time re-
quired before a merger is approved.
278. See Hayes, supra note 67, at 1546 (explaining that an administration's state-
ments and actions in the early stages of implementing a statute are particularly signifi-
cant in establishing precedent for the law's application); see also Haig v. Agee, 453
U.S. 280, 306 (1981) (citing Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 12 (1964)) (stating that
consistent executive construction and legislative reenactment of the statute may permit
the inference that the legislature ratified the executive's interpretation even in the ab-
sence of consistent practice or explicit legislative authorization). Once a policy or prac-
tice of evaluating acquisitions emerges in any given case, it will be more difficult not to
evaluate other cases with the same criteria. Id. Similarly, once the executive applies
inconsistent criteria to examine acquisitions, courts will circumscribe the freedom of
the government to intervene on the disfavored grounds. Id. at 300-06.
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Congress provided direction by requiring the president to consider
three factors when implementing the Exon-Florio Amendment: (1) do-
mestic production capacity; (2) preventing the erosion of the defense
industry of the United States; and (3) foreign control of United States
technologies. 279 Discussed below are the policy implications of using the
Exon-Florio Amendment for these purposes and for a potential fourth
purpose, which Congress did not discuss: economic coercion.
A. PROTECTION OF DoMESTIc ECONONc HEALTH Am GENERAL
WELFARE
Many individuals and organizations in the American business com-
munity could benefit from the government's use of Exon-Florio for eco-
nomic protectionism. Accordingly, after the passage of Exon-Florio,
CFIUS received numerous petitions from businesses expressing con-
cerns about the national security implications of mergers they were try-
ing to block for pecuniary reasons.280 Indeed, special interests with spe-
cific economic agendas were a large source of support for the measure
in Congress.281
One of the reasons some businesses advocate the use of Exon-Florio
is that current trends in foreign direct investment present problems for
the domestic economy. Overseas, exports from the United States must
compete for the same foreign money as United States assets. Some
sources suggest that undervaluation of United States assets in global
markets causes the United States to sell its capital assets faster than it
sells its products. 28 2 A difference between selling assets and capital is
that while businesses often reinvest profits from exports to build pro-
ductive capacity in the United States, foreign-owned firms repatriate
approximately seventy-nine percent of the profits earned to foreign par-
ent companies. 2 3 Thus, current foreign direct investment trends
279. 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 2170(e)(l)-(3) (1988).
280. Schumacher, supra note 41, at 22.
281. Foreign Takeovers Hearing, supra note 21, at 33. T. Boone Pickens, a well-
known maverick in the leveraged buy-out trade, became a strong supporter of the pro-
vision when Consolidated Gold Fields, a British firm with South African ties, acquired
a substantial interest in Newmont Mining Company with management's support. Id.
Mr. Pickens engaged in a hostile takeover attempt of Newmont with plans to dismantle
Newmont and liquidate its assets after he achieved corporate control. Id. Not surpris-
ingly, after Congress passed Exon-Florio, one of the first requests for an investigation
under the provision involved this particular merger. Id.
282. Foreign Investment in the U.S.: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Eco-
nomic Policy and Trade of the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 100th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1988) [hereinafter Foreign Investment Hearing] (statement of Dr. Susan
Tolchin, public administration professor George Washington University).
283. Id.
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threaten the trade balance and weaken the ability of the domestic in-
dustrial base to reinvest in future domestic productive capacity.
Despite the outcry for protectionism from businesses, the official pol-
icy of the United States supports an open international investment en-
vironment.2 " The premise of this policy is that in order to foster global
development, the government should not create trade barriers or pro-
mulgate measures that distort international capital and investment
flows.28 5 The Secretary of Commerce stated during the Exon-Florio
hearings that "[i]nternational investment is an important source of
capital which can stimulate international trade, and encourage speciali-
zation in goods and services in those countries that are most efficient
and keep the cost of capital down. 2 86 The executive order implement-
ing Exon-Florio reaffirms this policy, noting that the executive should
conduct actions under the new law in a manner that furthers the objec-
tives of the United States, including "opening international markets
[and] strengthening international institutions. 2 87
This policy of encouraging the unimpaired flow of international in-
vestment is consistent with the economic needs of the United States as
it wrestles with trade and budget deficits. To remain competitive, the
United States must take advantage of foreign capital in order to ex-
pand its production facilities. Without foreign capital, the United
States does not have the resources to meet the needs of a growing econ-
omy. Foreign direct investment helps the United States accumulate
funds necessary to purchase exports and to finance its fiscal debt with-
out causing staggering inflation. 88
A preferable source of foreign funds, however, is earnings generated
by sales of products and services that originate in the United States.
This is because foreign sales of domestic products do not diminish rein-
vestment of production profits, while sales of productive assets divert
profits overseas. Given the present weak economy of the United States,
cash infusions from foreign direct investment are necessary to prevent
interest rates from climbing substantially as the federal government
284. Acquisitions Hearing, supra note 21, at 2 (statement of Malcolm Baldridge,
Secretary of Commerce).
285. Id. at 19.
286. Foreign Takeovers Hearing, supra note 21, at 15-16 (statement of J. Michael
Farren, Deputy Under Secretary for International Trade, Department of Commerce).
287. Exec. Order No. 12,661, 3 C.F.R. 618, 624 (1989), reprinted In 19 U.S.C. §
2901 (1988).
288. See Foreign Investment Hearing, supra note 282 (statement of Elliot Richard-
son, Association for Foreign Investment in America) (unofficial transcript).
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competes with the private sector for fewer financial resources.280 The
damage that would result from higher interest rates would be more
harmful to the domestic economy than any reduced reinvestment of
profits that may result from foreign ownership of businesses based in
the United States.290 Furthermore, foreign direct investment has the
benefit of introducing new technology and management skills to the
United States that could improve productivity and expand employment.
Accordingly, governmental interference with private transactions
through the use of measures like Exon-Florio in efforts to reverse
trends in global investment may be a cure that would prove much more
damaging than the disease. As an assistant secretary for the Treasury
Department recently explained, "[c]ountries which have elaborate ar-
rangements to screen foreign investment have suffered major reductions
in investment flows and the related economic advantages which foreign
investment brings."2 91 For instance, a policy of governmental interven-
tion in acquisitions for reasons other than the prevention of the forma-
tion of trusts could undermine confidence in United States securities on
global markets." 2 This in turn could artificially reduce the price of
American securities, thereby increasing the probability of foreign take-
over attempts because domestic parties lose interest in continuing the
affected businesses' operations. Hence, the executive branch should be
wary of creating "a public predisposition to look for reasons to hinder
foreign investors engaged in complex market transactions." 2 3
Another benefit of foreign direct investment is that it may keep fail-
ing American firms alive. Foreign bidders often try to acquire busi-
nesses that are financially troubled-as was the case in the Fairchild
merger attempt.2 " Unless there is an intentional manipulation of in-
vestments for illegimate reasons, foreign investors endeavor to maxi-
mize profits from their investments in the United States.205 In most
situations, foreign parents find it advantageous to operate acquired
United States firms so that they may benefit from diversification as
well as lower operating costs in the United States. 2 8 Economic condi-
289. Richardson, Destiny Isn't Going out the Window: Buying of America Is In
Control and Helps Industry, Finance, LA. Times, July 31, 1988, § 5, at 5.
290. Id.
291. Foreign Takeovers Hearing, supra note 21, at 24 (statement of David C.




295. Gross, The Americanization of Honda, Bus. Wx., Apr. 25, 1988, at 90.
296. See Richardson, supra note 264, at 288 (interpreting increased foreign invest-
ment in America to reflect that there are economic incentives for such investment).
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tions may prevent domestic bidders from keeping a firm operational.
Consequently, blocking a foreign acquisition could lead to bankruptcy
or sale to a highly leveraged domestic buyer who may break up the
firm's capital assets to pay off debts on the investment.29 7 In most
cases, allowing foreigners to continue operating the firm is more benefi-
cial to the United States economy than ceasing the firm's operations.
In addition, unfettered governmental intervention in foreign invest-
ments could cause foreign governments to retaliate against prospective
investors from the United States and domestic firms already operating
abroad.2 98 The United States would face considerable losses from such
retaliation. American investors currently have approximately $1.2 tril-
lion invested abroad, while foreign private and governmental interests
have approximately $1.6 trillion invested in the United States.2 99
United States "persons," moreover, hold significantly more investments
involving direct ownership of interests in businesses abroad, than do
foreign investors in the United States.300 In addition, the United States
is by far the largest foreign investor in countries that account for most
direct investments in the United States.80 1 Thus, the United States
risks losing tremendous opportunities if those countries adopt restrictive
policies towards United States investments.
Furthermore, maintaining an open investment policy has long term
value, even if economic circumstances make this policy temporarily dis-
advantageous. Changes in global economic trends will invariably in-
crease the benefits derived from the ability of the United States to in-
vest freely abroad. The United States sets a good example
internationally by not altering its free-investment policy in response to
297. See Acquisitions Hearing, supra note 21, at 19 (statement of Malcolm Bal-
dridge) (noting that foreign investment brought vital capital into the United States).
298. Id. at 16 (statement of J. Michael Farren, Deputy Under Secretary for Inter-
national Trade, Department of Commerce).
299. C. AHo & M. LEVINSON, AFTER REAGAN: CONFRONTING THE CHANGED
WORLD ECONOMY (1988).
300. Foreign Investment Hearing, supra note 282 (statement of Elliot Richardson,
Association for Foreign Investment in America) (unofficial transcript).
301. Id. The British are the largest foreign investors in the United States with $75
billion, almost 29 % of total direct foreign investment. Id. American investment consti-
tutes 50% of all foreign direct investment in the United Kingdom. Id. The Dutch are
the second largest investing in the United States with $47 billion, almost 20% of total
foreign investment. Id. By contrast, in 1987, American investment comprised 40% of
foreign investment in the Netherlands. Id. The Japanese are now the third largest in-
vestor in the United States with $33.4 billion, 12.7% of total direct investment. Id.
American investors are the third largest investor in Japan with 44.1% of the total
foreign investment in 1987. Id. Canada is the fourth largest investor in the United
States with $21.3 billion, 8.3% of the total foreign investment. Id. In 1987, American
investment in Canada comprised 72% of its total foreign investments. Id.
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short-run economic circumstances. Hence, reciprocal relationships that
respect the principal of free investment are natural in a world economy
that is increasingly more interconnected. 0 2
The United States has been a leader in the global movement to re-
move barriers to international investment.103 At present, the United
States is planning a campaign to reduce and eliminate barriers to in-
vestment that trading partners, particularly developing countries, main-
tain.3 0 This includes initiatives to forge an agreement on trade-related
investment measures (TRIMS) during the Uruguay round of the
GATT, to strengthen the OECD's national treatment instrument, and
to generate bilateral discussions.305 The Omnibus Trade Act that con-
tains Exon-Florio anticipates the continued leadership of the United
States in the elimination of barriers to international investment that
distort international trade.306 The United States would have difficulty
negotiating for more open investment policies in other countries if the
United States restricts foreign businesses' access to the United
States.3 0 7 Use of Exon-Florio for protection of economic interests of the
United States would damage the credibility of the United States on
investment issues308 and may cause the United States to lose its leader-
ship position in this area.30 The United States has no convincing policy
rationale to justify deviation from open investment principles in order
to realize short-term economic goals. The government would make a
serious mistake in stretching the concept of national security in the
Exon-Florio Amendment to promote a protectionist agenda.
B. ECONOMIC COERCION
While protectionist strategies attempt to directly benefit the economy
of the country employing them, economic coercion strategies operate
302. Foreign Takeovers Hearing, supra note 21, at 69-70 (statement of Richard B.
Leather).
303. Acquisitions Hearing, supra note 20, at 19 (statement of Malcolm Badridge,
Secretary of Commerce).
304. See id. at 54 (1987) (statement of Robert McNeill, Emergency Committee
for International Trade) (discussing the objectives of the United States in the Uraguay
Round).
305. Id. at 16 (statement of J. Michael Farren, Deputy Under Secretary for Inter-
national Trade, Department of Commerce).
306. 19 U.S.C. § 2902(b)(1) (1988).
307. Foreign Investment Hearing, supra note 282 (statement of Elliot Richardson,
Association for Foreign Investment in America).
308. Acquisitions Hearing, supra note 21, at 18 (statement of Malcolm Badridge,
Secretary of Commerce).
309. Foreign Takeovers Hearing, supra note 21, at 16 (statement of J. Michael
Farren, Deputy Under Secretary for International Trade, Department of Commerce).
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indirectly through the application of pressure on the economies of for-
eign governments or other foreign entities. Coercive strategies seek to
withold the economic benefits derived from foreign investment until the
foreign investor agrees to make some economic or political concession.
Thus, the government could use Exon-Florio as a strategy to pressure
foreign governments into modifying investment, trade, or other policies
that concern the United States. For example, the United States has
employed economic sanctions to increase diplomatic leverage in many
situations, including the emigration of Soviet Jews, South Africa's
apartheid policies, the democratization of Panama and Nicaragua, and
Iraq's conquest of Kuwait.310
Arguably, resorting to economic coercion will rarely be necessary to
protect national security. Nevertheless, the broad nature of the national
security standard in Exon-Florio would permit the use of coercive strat-
egies under Exon-Florio. Although the IEEPA also permits institution
of investment restrictions, Exon-Florio provides a useful intermediate
measure that allows more flexibility and responsiveness than the blan-
ket restrictions typically imposed under IEEPA.3 11
An example of the use of Exon-Florio for economic coercion is Presi-
dent Bush's decision to block the sale of Mamco Manufacturing, Inc., a
Seattle based company specializing in aircraft parts, to a military-re-
lated agency of the Chinese government.-"2 Although the president jus-
tified the decision on technology security grounds,313 announcement of
the decision coincided with the president's decision to veto a congres-
sional act that granted one-year visa extensions to Chinese students
studying in the United States.31' While President Bush rejected the
visa extension to avoid disrupting relations between the United States
and China, he did not want China to interpret the veto as United
States complacency towards China's human rights violations in the
Tianamen Square incident.3 15 In this situation, Exon-Florio provided a
mechanism to communicate dissatisfaction with China's policies and to
310. Scott, U.S.-Soviet Trade 1970-1982: Twelve Years a Hostage to Politics and
Unrelated Foreign Policy, in COMMON SENSE IN U.S.-SoviET TRADE 23 (1983).
311. See, e.g., Exec. Order No. 12,205, 3 C.F.R. 248 (1981) (prohibiting transac-
tions with Iran).
312. Rosenthal, Bush, Citing Security Law, Voids Sale of Aviation Concern to
China, N.Y. Times, Feb. 3, 1990, at Al. The People's Republic of China Ministry of
Aerospace Industry owns the China National Aero-Technology Import and Export
Corporation, the prosepective purchaser. Id. at 9.
313. Id.
314. Wu Dunn, China Bitterly Protests Sanctions by Congress, N.Y. Times, Feb.
3, 1990, at 9.
315. Wilhelm, Purchase Will End China's Control of MAMCO, 14 PUGET SOUND
Bus. J. 1 (1990).
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quiet domestic criticism of President Bush's weak response to China's
human rights abuses. As an intermediate measure, the president's ac-
tions sent a somewhat ambiguous signal to the Chinese government,
often a necessary tactic in the foggy world of diplomacy. In cases of
more serious disagreement such as the United States' dispute with
Iraq, Exon-Florio adds a weapon to the economic warfare arsenal of
the United States to destabilize unfriendly regimes and to make exam-
ples of them to other foreign states.310
Historically, the trading partners of the United States have been less
open to foreign direct investment than the United States. Some of the
countries have laws and regulations providing their governments with
broad authority to restrict investment for reasons related to national
security. For example, Japan may suspend, request modifications, or
request extended periods to review foreign investments that "might im-
peril the national security, disturb the maintenance of public order,...
hamper the protection or safety of the public,... adversely and seri-
ously affect business enterprises engaging in a line of business similar
or related to the one in which the direct investment . . . is to be made,
or the smooth performance of [its] national economy." 317 Great Brit-
ain, France, Canada and other countries have similar laws.3 18 Some
suggest using Exon-Florio to retaliate against countries using these
laws as barriers to United States investments.31 0 Indeed, Exon-Florio
may provide some leverage in bilateral and multilateral negotiations to
restrict definitions of "national security" in laws similar to Exon-Florio
that exist in other countries.
Nevertheless, laws in other countries are often much less of a barrier
to foreign direct investment than is commonly believed in the United
States. In Japan, for example, legal and regulatory restrictions no
longer present major barriers to foreign direct investment.320 The Japa-
nese government does not use and is unlikely to use its broad powers to
restrict foreign investment because the Japanese have liberalized their
investment policy under the OECD Capital Movements Code and simi-
lar international agreements. 321 The major challenge to United States
investment in Japan results from long-nurtured "insider" relationships
316. Scott, supra note 310, at 24.
317. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e)(2) (1988) (discussing factors the president may
consider in reviewing certain mergers, acquisitions, and takeovers).
318. Acquisitions Hearing, supra note 21, at 9, 13 (statement of Malcolm Bal-
dridge, Secretary of Commerce).
319. Foreign Takeovers Hearing, supra note 21, at 27-28 (statement of Rep.
Florio).
320. Richardson, supra note 264, at 305.
321. Id.
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between Japanese industry and government as well as the strong cul-
tural preference for buying from Japanese companies and establishing
business relationships with them. 22
Accordingly, caution should dictate the use of Exon-Florio for diplo-
matic coercion or retaliation. Other governments are influenced by eco-
nomic, political, and social forces that clamor for the protection of their
assets from foreign direct investment similar to those that demand pro-
tection in the United States. Strong-arm tactics using the "privilege" of
investment in the United States to force foreign nations to open their
markets could foster protectionist tendencies in the international com-
munity. Moreover, use of Exon-Florio as a diplomatic "stick" will not
necessarily be effective or achieve desired results. Economic coercion
often stiffens the resolve of nations and makes political compromise
more difficult.828
The recent imposition of punitive sanctions against Toshiba Machine
Company and Kongsberg Trading Company 824 is indicative of a new
trend in the economic policy of the United States. Rather than punish-
ing foreign states, the government directs these sanctions at specific
corporations acting contrary to the policy goals of the United States.
As large multinational enterprises become more powerful, the ability to
take actions against national security interests of the United States will
increase. Therefore, Exon-Florio may prove to be a useful tool in the
imposition of corporate-specific sanctions.
As explained in detail above, economic coercion strategies also may
undercut the obligations of the United States under international
agreements. However, these strategies are less likely than a protection-
ist investment policy to threaten the entire framework of international
investment law because they are directed towards specific countries and
organizations. If the policy of a foreign government or organization be-
comes objectionable, withdrawal or renegotiation of bilateral agree-
ments governing investment may occur. The United States, however,
should consider the consequences of departure from open investment
policies when the target state is a party to multilateral agreements such
as the OECD Code. 25
322. Crabb, The Reality of Extralegal Barriers to Mergers and Acquisitions in
Japan, 21 INT'L LAW. 97 (1987); Reynolds, Foreign Investment In Japan: The Legal
and Social Climate, 18 TEx. INT'L L.J. 175 (1983).
323. Scott, supra note 310, at 24.
324. Exec. Order No. 12,661, 54 Fed. Reg. 5, 780 (1989).
325. See CAPITAL MOVEMENTS CODE, supra note 226, at 46 (requiring OECD
members to promote open investment policies).
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In short, any use or allusion to use of economic coercion under Exon-
Florio in international relations should be made delicately and with co-
ordination among allies and between federal agencies. Nevertheless, the
use of economic coercion through Exon-Florio is an option for the pres-
ident to consider when examining alternative punitive sanctions against
foreign states and corporations.
C. PROTECTING THE DEFENSE INDUSTRIAL BASE
In the debates concerning the defense industrial base, the alleged
dangers of international direct investment fit into two broad categories.
First, there is the danger that specific foreign investors would suddenly
halt key defense production causing a crisis or hampering efforts of the
United States to respond in the event of a crisis.320 Second, overall for-
eign direct investment might gradually erode the net industrial capac-
ity of the United States. This, in turn, could impede the ability of the
United States to meet peacetime modernization goals or slow down in-
dustrial mobilization in the event of war.32 7
At present, the first of these alleged dangers is not significant.
United States industry remains sufficiently competitive, diversified, and
resilient to handle even the most carefully coordinated schemes of in-
ternational investors. Foreign direct investment represents only approx-
imately five percent of all United States corporate assets, 3 23 and spe-
cific sectoral controls prevent foreign direct investment in many
strategic industries.32 9 Foreign owners cannot transfer factories, miner-
als in mines, and physical plants to other countries overnight; they can
only sell or close them. If there are limited supplies of a good that the
firm produces, and a high demand for the good in the economy, who-
ever owns the firm would have adequate incentives to maintain produc-
tion. Therefore, if assets are sold, the new buyers would presumably
continue production. The IEEPA and the Defense Production Act
could address attempts to close key production facilities during a cri-
sis.3s Under these laws, the United States government can, if neces-
326. M. TOLCHIN & S. ToLCrN, BUYING INTO AMERICA: How FOREIGN MONEY
IS CHANGING THE FACE OF OUR NATION 219, 261-64 (1988).
327. Id.
328. See Richardson, supra note 264, at 5 (arguing that there is only nominal for-
eign investment in corporate assets of the United States).
329. Id. Sectoral controls severely regulate, limit, and prohibit foreign direct invest-
ment in communications, nuclear power, aviation, COMSAT, LANDSAT, water-borne
transportation, and radio broadcasting. Id.
330. See, e.g., IEEPA, 50 U.S.C. § 1701 (1988).
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sary, seize control of industrial production facilities and maintain the
requisite production levels.
The same economic factors that prevent sudden shut down of key
defense production also reduce the risk of gradual erosion of the overall
defense industrial base. If a slow decline in industrial capacity oc-
curred, however, it would be difficult to resort to emergency powers or
the Defense Production Act to prevent the closing of operations or the
conversion of operations to non-strategic uses, absent a crisis. 8 1 A
firm's movement from a strategically important industry would provide
financial incentives for other firms to fill in the gaps left in the market,
but there would be some delay before a new firm could take over pro-
duction. Although serious danger to national security from temporary
gaps in industrial capacity is improbable, it may be prudent, neverthe-
less, for the government to monitor developments in this area.
The government can evaluate risks from foreign acquisitions to the
long term health of the defense industrial base through analysis of
three interrelated factors that are similar to the factors outlined in sub-
section 2170(e) of Exon-Florio: (1) the significance of the product of
the United States entity being acquired for defense purposes;3 2 (2) the
amount of time, resources, and effort required for remaining domestic
industry to fill in gaps in defense production if the acquired firm dis-
continues a particular type of production;333 and (3) the relative
probability that a foreign investor could and would take action that
might result in the discontinuance of a particular product line.33
Subjective factors such as individual service priorities, defense pro-
duction particular to a local economy, parochial interests of the defense
community, and differences of opinion about goals, strategies, and tac-
tics often influence assessments of the importance of particular types of
defense-related production. 3 5 As a result, defense production priorities
are not easily ordered or rated, but vary with different strategists' pro-
jections of future defense requirements. 6 Any attempt to precisely de-
fine or codify defense priorities would be needlessly contentious and the
results quickly would become obsolete.
331. Defense Production Act, 50 U.S.C. app. § 2158 (1988).
332. See 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(e)(1)-(3) (1988) (listing factors the president may
consider to prevent foreign takeovers of domestic businesses for national security
reasons).
333. Id. § 2170(e)(2).
334. Id. § 2170(e)(3).
335. See generally W. KAUFMAN, DEFENSE IN THE 1980's (1981) (noting the differ-




Nevertheless, in order to apply Exon-Florio effectively, the govern-
ment must roughly rank the importance of certain types of production.
If the government accords all defense production the same level of im-
portance, the president might unnecessarily exercise powers in some sit-
uations, yet fail to take necessary precautions in others. Assessments
should be based on realistic analysis of the roles that given products
play in actual defense plans; if in a given case the primary concern is
mobilization requirements, then the executive should analyze present
operational plans with consideration of the probability that world
events will require them to be activated. If the primary concern is mod-
ernization, the executive's analysis should concentrate on the actual
strategic consequences of delays in meeting production goals. If the pri-
mary concern is readiness or endurance, the executive should use both
static and dynamic models to determine whether gaps in production
could have any appreciable effects and, if so, the actual military signifi-
cance of these effects. If the primary concern is research and develop-
ment, analysis should include the probability of whether investigations
will enhance the affordability, dependability, and performance of weap-
ons systems. 337
In most cases, agency analysts considering whether to block an ac-
quisition will limit their evaluations of the importance of the firms' de-
fense production to those firms that provide products either directly to
the military or to suppliers of components and materials used to make
products that the military uses.333 The most significant problems of in-
terpretation are likely to arise, however, when the president applies
Exon-Florio to businesses that are not exclusively devoted to national
defense purposes, but are nevertheless important to national security.
This would include, for example, the acquisition of assets related to
strategic resources such as petroleum.
In a case recently brought before the CFIUS, for example, four
members of Congress requested an investigation of the bid of a Saudi
government-owned corporation for a fifty percent share of certain Tex-
aco, Inc. operations. 339 The proposed acquisition involved refineries, ter-
337. See U.S. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES PLAN 5 (Mar. 15,
1989) [hereinafter DOD Plan] (discussing the need for high performance and high
quality critical technologies) (on file with The American University Journal of Interna-
tional Law and Policy). This analysis might also consider new military capabilities,
projections of the effect of foreign control on availability of certain technologies for
military production, and consequences of delaying incorporation of technologies into
weapons support systems.
338. Tolchin, Crucial Technologies: 22 Make the US. List, N.Y. Times, Mar. 17,
1989, at Dl.
339. Daily Rep. for Execs. (BNA) (Dec. 21, 1988).
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minals, service stations, and franchises in twenty-three southwestern
states.340 The lawmakers' main criticisms of the proposed acquisition,
however, did not concern Texaco's ability to supply the military. In-
stead, they complained that the acquisition would give the Saudis influ-
ence over United States downstream oil operations because they would
be able to fix low crude oil prices while earning increased profits at the
gasoline refining and marketing levels.3 41 Hence, the main concern
about the proposed merger, the competitiveness of American oil com-
panies, was economic, not military, in nature.
Oil is so important to the American economy that the government
often views any threat to its supply at reasonable prices as a danger to
the security interests of the United States. 42 Promulgation of the
Carter Doctrine, which implicitly threatens the use of military force
against any power that interferes with the free flow of oil from the
Persian Gulf, demonstrates how far the United States will go to protect
its petroleum interests. 43 Military measures of foreign governments
that disrupt functions of United States domestic oil producers or de-
crease the supply of gasoline necessarily involve national security is-
sues. For instance, the government has implemented section 232 of the
Trade Act of 1962 several times to regulate imports of foreign oil for
national security reasons.3 44 Policy, therefore, should not preclude the
use of statutes designed to protect national security interests when ac-
quisitions lead to monopolistic control of resources.
To prevent foreign acquisitions that will lead to control of resources
key to national security, the United States has specific programs to im-
prove its leadership in these industrial sectors.3 45 There is concern
within the Department of Defense that foreign control of United States
industries benefitting from such programs might undermine defense in-
dustrial policy goals. There is particular concern about foreign acquisi-
340. Id.
341. Id.
342. See Brezezinski, The True U.S. Interest in the Gulf, Wash. Post, Aug. 16,
1990, at A23 (indicating that potential loss of oil supplies is the primary cause of the
conflict in the Gulf).
343. See id. (discussing the promulgation of the Carter Doctrine).
344. See, e.g., Federal Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 569
(1976) (justifying the use of section 232 for national security reasons).
345. See NATIONAL SECURITY AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS DIVISION, U.S. GEN-
ERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, BRIEFING REPORT TO SEN. JOHN HEINZ, INDUSTRIAL
BASE: DEFENSE-CRITICAL INDUSTRIES 5 (Aug. 1988) (identifying support programs for
industries critical to the Department of Defense) (on file with The American University
Journal of International Law and Policy). To enhance and support defense-critical
industries, Department of Defense programs include projects involving semiconductors,
gas turbine engines, machine tools, and bearings. Id.
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tions of semiconductor manufacturing firms.346 Such firms are benefi-
ciaries of the United States SEMATECH program. SEMATECH is a
consortium of semiconductor manufacturers that the Department of
Defense funds "to conduct research and development on advanced
semiconductor manufacturing techniques"347 and to adapt manufactur-
ing techniques "to a variety of semiconductor products. '"u 8 Neverthe-
less, if companies benefitting from these programs continue to supply
defense needs from United States-based production facilities, the de-
fense industrial base of the United States improves regardless of
whether the firms are domestically or internationally owned. Yet the
possibility that a foreign owner may reap financial benefits from United
States government subsidies is an economic, not a military concern."
Analysts should avoid confusion among military production, economic,
and technology transfer issues, to reduce uncertainty in the evaluation
of acquisition cases.
The amount of time, effort, and resources required for domestic in-
dustry to fill gaps in defense production caused by closure or conversion
of an acquired firm's operations varies with the type of production in-
volved. In most industries, substitutes are readily available in the mar-
ketplace, and existing firms can either increase production or revamp
plant facilities to fill supply gaps. Substitutions are easiest to obtain
where the firm's production does not involve advanced technologies or
where production closely resembles goods used in the civilian sector.
Where goods require sophisticated equipment for production, utilize
leading-edge technologies, or are unique, alternative suppliers may
need lead time and substantial investment to fill supply gaps.
Because modern warfare involves increasingly sophisticated equip-
ment, the Department of Defense uses numerous products that would
require significant lead time to develop new supply sources. Conse-
quently, when a firm that produces sophisticated technological mer-
chandise for the Department of Defense becomes the target of foreign
direct investment, the Department of Defense should have the informa-
tion needed to evaluate what is necessary to develop a second source.
When foreign investment targets defense subcontractors, the Depart-
ment of Defense should be aware of other firms that produce their own
subcomponents (captive producers), as well as those that produce sub-




349. See Acquisitions Hearing, supra note 21, at 5 (noting the protection that ex-
port control laws afford against hostile foreign takeovers).
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components for sale to industry (merchant producers). The Department
of Defense should also examine the impact of any delays on operational
plans and strategic requirements.
Determining the probability that a foreign investor might discontinue
a particular product line requires an exploration of the foreign inves-
tor's motivation for investing. First, the analysis should discover any
affiliations between the foreign investor and foreign governments or
groups that may plan to manipulate the investment holdings for reasons
other than profit maximization. Investigators, however, rarely would
uncover evidence of a foreign firm's intent to politically manipulate in-
vestments. Nevertheless, indications that a firm may not have a long
term commitment to a production industry can be inferred from an
analysis of the history of its operations. If the firm does not appear to
possess sufficient market share, capital, or technical expertise to
weather the vagaries of the industry, or a corporate culture conducive
to the production line, there is reason to question the corporation's long
term intentions. In addition, some corporations may have economic in-
centives to discontinue profitable lines of production. This could occur,
for example, when a foreign firm trades profits for market power where
the acquired firm sells unique goods used in the production processes of
a firm in competition with the foreign parent.3 50
Yet, even if there are indications that a new parent may have rea-
sons to manipulate production, CFIUS may conclude after negotiations
that the new owners intend to honor commitments under current and
future defense-related contracts. Further, trustee arrangements under
the DISP could increase the likelihood that foreign owners will operate
the firm in a manner consistent with the interests of the United States.
To ensure that the United States would not exercise its Exon-Florio
powers, the investors could agree to meet specific production goals, up-
grade capital equipment, undertake new hiring, or take other actions to
improve the probability of continued operations. Parties could enforce
these agreements in court under traditional contract theory, promissory
estoppel, third-party beneficiary theory or under the ethics require-
ments of the Federal Acquisition Regulations. Escrow accounts also
could insure parties against a breach. CFIUS regulations that formal-
350. See Acquisitions Hearing, supra note 21, at 28-29 (statement of Joe Parkin-
son, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Micron Technology, Inc.) (testifying that
the Japanese employ questionable trade practices targeting American businesses). An-
other strategy the Japanese may employ combines unfair trade practices with targeted
corporate acquisitions in an effort to dismantle American competition. Id. Some allege
that Japanense companies used these strategies to overpower United States DRAM
manufacturers between 1985 and 1987. Id.
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ize a process for entering these agreements could increase the likeli-
hood of judicial enforcement.3 51
The possibility that foreign investment will result in the flight of in-
dustrial research, development, and engineering facilities overseas is of
particular concern to policy makers.352 Some fear that a foreign firm
would move its research and development operations abroad, retaining
only production facilities in the United States.353 Relocation of research
facilities abroad could diminish the technological lead time necessary
for the United States to maintain military superiority.3 " Yet, there is
no reason to assume that in general, foreign firms would be more likely
than United States firms to relocate facilities, unless it would promote
economic efficiency or attract more talented personnel. 55 Some have
voiced concerns that cultural differences may cause certain countries to
make non-economic decisions, but this ignores the economic motiva-
tions that inspired the initial investment. 5 6
Measuring the overall possible negative implications of foreign direct
investment involves weighing relative risks. Limiting the pool of inves-
tors to United States citizens also presents risks. For instance, a foreign
investor with solid capital might be more likely to continue operation of
a United States-based facility in operation than an American buyer
attempting a leveraged buy-out with uncertain financing. 67 It may be
preferable to have a foreign entity gain control of a United States firm
351. There are risks, however, in formalizing this process. Foreign investors may
interpret the requirement to enter agreements as a vehicle for governmental interven-
tion into investment deals. This could cause foreign investors to lose confidence in the
security of new investment in United States industry.
352. See Burgess & Richards, Does Foreign Investment In US. Pose a Threat?,
Wash. Post, Oct. 23, 1990, at C1 (noting concern in the Bush administration over the
loss of innovative technology through foreign acquisitions).
353. Address by Congressman Les Aspin, The Johns Hopkins University School of
Advanced International Studies: Foreign Policy Institute, Seminar on Foreign Owner-
ship of U.S. Defense Industries and National Security (Mar. 15, 1989) [hereinafter
Les Aspin Address].
354. DOD Plan, supra note 337, at 9.
355. Address by Theodore Moran, The Johns Hopkins University School of Ad-
vanced International Studies: Foreign Policy Institute, Seminar on Foreign Ownershlp
of U.S. Defense Industries and National Security (Mar. 15, 1989).
356. Address by Richard Danzig, The Johns Hopkins University School of Ad-
vanced International Studies: Foreign Policy Institute, Seminar on Foreign Ownership
of U.S. Defense Industries and National Security (Mar. 15, 1989).
357. See Acquisitions Hearing, supra note 21, at 32 (statement of Robert Mercer,
Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co.) (arguing that
corporate raiding tactics erode the United States defense industrial base and threaten
the national security of the United States). If this assertion is correct, domestic take-
over attempts in other circumstances could pose similar security problems. Hence, use
of Exon-Florio to address hostile corporate takeovers would discriminate unfairly
against foreign investors and violate the principal of national treatment.
1991]
AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
or operation than to have it scrapped and sold piecemeal by a leveraged
buy-out "green-mail" specialist. Current exchange rates aid the foreign
investor through increased financial benefits to foreign firms that serve
United States markets through domestic production rather than
through imports. Another risk of government intervention in investment
decisions is that prices of defense products may increase due to in-
creased efficiency costs.358 Moreover, permitting foreign investment
helps prevent situations requiring more drastic government intervention
to preserve ailing industries.3 19
Because laws of the United States contain adequate provisions to
prevent most threats to the industrial base, there is no reason to resort
to use of Exon-Florio, especially in light of the perceptions of increased
risk that such use may create among international investors. This is
particularly true when Exon-Florio involves asserting an "essential se-
curity interest" under international agreements. Any investment large
enough to raise industrial base concerns is likely to implicate some in-
ternational agreement. In rare cases, a security threat may be great
enough to override these concerns. Observers, however, should view
claims about the magnitude of such security threats with skepticism.
D. PREVENTING HARMFUL TECHNOLOGICAL OUTFLOWS
As explained above, the legislative history of Exon-Florio indicates
that technology transfer was not a major concern of the Amendment
after the Reagan administration demonstrated to Congress that export
control laws were sufficient to prevent harmful technological out-
flows.360 Nevertheless, the statute does not contain any language limit-
ing the president's authority to use Exon-Florio in unforeseen circum-
stances where existing legislation does not adequately address
technology transfer problems.
Since the enactment of Exon-Florio, the government appears to have
found the Amendment far more useful as a measure to deal with the
transfer of critical technology to economic and military competitors
358. Les Aspin Address, supra note 353.
359. See, e.g., President Reagan Decides against Action to Limit Imports of Anti-
Friction Bearings, Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 47, at 1560 (Nov. 30, 1988) (reporting
that increased foreign investment in the ball bearing industry helped the Reagan ad-
ministration to avoid restricting imports of ball bearings under section 232 of the Trade
Expansion Act).
360. See Acquisitions Hearing, supra note 20, at 5 (testimony of Malcolm Bal-
dridge, Secretary of Commerce) (arguing that export control laws provide enough pro-
tection against hostile foreign investments).
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than with the erosion of the defense industrial base.30' In the two in-
stances that the government used Exon-Florio to block foreign take-
overs, the government cited sensitive weapons technology transfer con-
cerns to justify its actions.36 2 The Defense Technology Security Agency
has emerged as one of the most important players in the application of
Exon-Florio within the Department of Defense. Moreover, the execu-
tive order implementing Exon-Florio specifically mentions "preventing
the export of strategic goods and technologies to proscribed destina-
tions" as an objective for action.363
Foreign acquisitions of firms employing sophisticated technology are
likely to raise such technology transfer issues. A CFIUS investigation
of a sophisticated technology firm, therefore, should evaluate the tech-
nology transfer issues raised. This evaluation should consider whether
the technology is already available commercially, whether it involves
classified information, and whether the purchasing country already has
access to the technology. In addition, CFIUS should consider the for-
eign investor's COCOM364 and export controls compliance records.
CFIUS also should evaluate the probability of leaks of military tech-
nologies to potential adversaries and other parties whose possession of
such technologies might be destabilizing, and the military significance
of such leaks. Finally, CFIUS should verify that key personnel are not
involved with data collection for hostile intelligence services, industrial
espionage, or circumvention of export control regulations.
To aid in analysis, the Department of Defense has prepared reports
selecting and describing technologies most essential for long term supe-
361. See Burgess & Richards, supra note 352, at C1 (reporting concerns about
technology transfers through acquisitions); Les Aspin Address, supra note 353. Ac-
cording to Congressman Aspin, to the extent that foreign ownership of United States
defense industries is a problem, it is not a problem of the defense industrial base. Id.
Although defense industries could benefit from Exon-Florio by securing protection from
hostile foreign takeovers, the loss of access to foreign capital offsets this benefit. Id.
Exon-Florio and related measures, therefore, provide better control over outflows of
critical technologies. Id.
362. See Farnsworth, supra note 32, at Dl (reporting the blocked sale of nuclear
weapons industry to Japan); see also Rosenthal, supra note 32, at Al (reporting Presi-
dent Bush's refusal to sell an American airplane parts manufacturer to China).
363. Exec. Order No. 12,661, 3 C.F.R. 618, 624 (1989), reprinted In 19 U.S.C. §
2901 (1988), 54 Fed. Reg. 5, 784 (Jan. 9, 1989)
364. See Statement of Richard N. Perle, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Inter-
national Security before the Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, the Perma-
nent Subcommittee on Investigations (April 11, 1984) (on file with The American Uni-
versity Journal of International Law and Policy) (defining COCOM as a mniltilateral
coordinating committee in Paris that controls strategic trade with Warsaw Pact na-
tions). The committee is composed of representatives from Japan and from all NATO
members except Spain and Iceland. Id.
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riority of United States weapons systems.3 65 These sources assist in
evaluating the technology transfer implications of various acquisition
proposals. These reports, however, should not substitute for an individ-
ual case analysis because no list is completely comprehensive nor can it
address the consequences of diverting the technology to different desti-
nations.3 66 Moreover, consequences of the transfer will differ depending
on whether the technology is embodied in written or recorded form,
technical equipment, or technical and engineering knowledge.3 61
Although other laws could address most of the technology transfer
problems .that a CFIUS investigation discloses, circumstances may
arise for which Exon-Florio is more appropriate. For example, export
control laws depend on high-technology corporations' good faith com-
pliance with reporting requirements. Where it is doubtful that a foreign
parent will comply with export control rules, resorting to Exon-Florio
may be preferable. 6 "
Acquisitions need not directly involve high technology or classified
assets to create an intelligence or technological security risk. Eastern
bloc intelligence services, for instance, have benefited from the use of a
variety of legitimate businesses as fronts for intelligence operations. For
example, the Soviet Union recently attempted to purchase several
banks in the Silicon Valley through a third party.369 Through this ac-
quisition, Soviet intelligence services could have acquired information
about defense contractors' and subcontractors' transactions, and, as a
result, gained information about the government's financial transac-
tions. This information, in turn, could reveal which types of compo-
nents comprise leading-edge defense systems. The Soviets also could
learn about technological developments through a review of firms' loan
applications. More importantly, the Soviets could use the data about
employees of high technology firms to undermine their loyalty.
365. See DOD Plan, supra note 337, at 5 (discussing the need for high perform-
ance and high quality critical technologies); DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE MILITARILY
CRITICAL TECHNOLOGIES LIST (1987).
366. See DOD Plan, supra note 337, at 6 (warning that national security ramifica-
tions exist although the Critical Technologies List may not include certain
technologies).
367. Address by James Nelson, The Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced
International Studies: Foreign Policy Institute, Seminar on Foreign Ownership of U.S.
Defense Industries and National Security (Mar. 15, 1989). Unsophisticated applica-
tion of the Militarily Critical Technologies List to export controls has been a source of
inter-agency conflict and frustration for United States industry. Id.
368. Differing Views on Exon-Florio Amendment Presented at House Subcommit-
tee Hearing, 7 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) No. 13, at 444 (Mar. 28, 1990).
369. Foreign Investment Hearing, supra note 274 (statement of Dr. Susan Tolchin,




In addition, damaging data transfers can occur without violating ex-
port control laws. For example, suppliers of certain unclassified techno-
logical components to key defense industrial sectors and research facili-
ties might acquire knowledge of production levels, as well as research
and development directions that they could provide to foreign entities.
Contracts to supply such technological components for industrial re-
search and production, however, often include security agreements that
prohibit transfer of proprietary data .37 Nevertheless, the mere exis-
tence of a private cause of action would probably not deter the activi-
ties of foreign governmental and industrial intelligence organizations.
Thus, Exon-Florio may have some application to transfers that need
stronger security safeguards.
Use of Exon-Florio for technology transfer concerns may provide a
useful official rationale for measures that serve diplomatic and political
objectives, such as President Bush's decision to block the sale of
Mamco Manufacturing to the Chinese government.37 1 Because restric-
tions on the export of defense related technology are an internationally
recognized national security interest, the government may use technol-
ogy transfer justifications to circumvent investment-related treaties.
The government, however, should avoid over-politicizing the technology
transfer rationale because this may cause businesses and foreign gov-
ernments to become increasingly suspicious of its use.
Many of the countries that would raise the greatest technology se-
curity concerns if they acquired United States companies, such as the
Soviet Union and East European nations, are not parties to open invest-
ment treaties with the United States. In these cases, the government
could use Exon-Florio to prevent harmful technology transfers without
violating international obligations. When treaty obligations are present,
however, the government may have difficulty justifying selective
prohibitions of foreign acquisitions on the basis of essential security in-
terests. Justifying the use of Exon-Florio in such cases may require di-
vulging in court information about foreign intelligence operations and
specific security problems within the acquiring entity. The United
States government may be understandably reluctant to divulge such in-
formation. When the government considers using Exon-Florio to pre-
370. See Swennen, Federal Restrictions on Participation by Foreign Investors In
Defense and Other Government Contracts, in MANUAL OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN
THE UNITED STATES 181 (1984) (stating that "classified contracts must contain a
clause requiring the contractor to execute a security agreement...').
371. See Rosenthal, supra note 32, at Al (noting that political motives may have
driven President Bush's decision to block the sale of an American company to the
Chinese).
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vent technological espionage, therefore, it should evaluate any agree-
ments that allow courts to determine the existence of threats to
essential security interests.
CONCLUSION
The term national security as used in the Exon-Florio Amendment
lends itself to broad interpretation. Although the congressional debate
over Exon-Florio refers to the national security standard almost exclu-
sively in relation to threats to the defense industrial base and defense
preparedness, 72 the standard may encompass a broad spectrum of
other issues including the economic health of the United States, and
concerns about technology transfers. 3
The Amendment's requirement that the president must certify that
provisions of law other than the IEEPA and Exon-Florio do not "in the
President's judgment provide adequate and appropriate security
S. ., does not inhibit the legal authority of the president to block
acquisitions because of statutory restrictions on judicial review.375 Nev-
ertheless, in almost every foreseeable situation, other existing law
should be sufficient to meet national security requirements and would
be a preferable tool for dealing with potential threats.
The most significant substantive limitations on executive discretion
under Exon-Florio are the international obligations of the United
States. Almost all foreign direct investment in the United States is
from states with which the United States has agreements providing for
national treatment of foreign investment.376 Existing commitments
under these treaties are legally binding on the president under the
terms of the statute.3 77 Although these treaties contain exceptions al-
lowing parties to take actions to protect essential security interests, the
ICJ may overturn decisions to invoke these exceptions.37 8
In addition, many individual businesses could benefit from use of
Exon-Florio for economic protectionism. Yet in order for the United
States to effectively pursue broad economic goals using the Exon-Florio
Amendment, it would have to apply an expanded economic definition of
national security in disputes with states party to free investment agree-
372. Foreign Takeovers Hearing, supra note 21, at 25-57 (statement of Congress-
man Florio).
373. Id. at 27 (statement of J. Michael Farren).
374. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d)(2) (1988).
375. Id. § 2170(d).
376. Grimes & Williams, supra note 208, at 20.
377. CONF. REP., supra note 27, at 927.
378. E.g., (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (Judgment on the Merits of June 27).
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ments. 79 In the case of agreements that allow the ICJ to determine
whether threats to a party's essential security interests exist, the appli-
cation of broad economic definitions of national security when using
Exon-Florio would probably result in breach of these agreements-in
direct violation of congressional intent. ° In the case of agreements
that allow the United States to determine whether threats to its essen-
tial security interests exist, resorting to broad definitions under Exon-
Florio could render open investment agreements meaningless. More-
over, use of Exon-Florio for economic protection could undermine con-
fidence in United States securities on global markets, reduce beneficial
investment flows, and increase the probability that firms in need of cap-
ital will go out of business. Such use also raises the possibility of for-
eign government retaliation, and could cause the United States to lose
its position of leadership in efforts to open the world's investment mar-
kets. Using Exon-Florio to advance broad economic goals under the
guise of preventing the impairment of national security would be a
mistake.
Similarly, use of Exon-Florio to coerce economic and political con-
cessions from foreign governments could strengthen protectionist ten-
dencies abroad and violate the obligations of the United States under
international agreements. If used carefully, however, the Amendment
may provide a useful means to get foreign governments to open up
their own investment markets and sanction their foreign or domestic
policies. Economic coercion strategies are less likely to threaten the en-
tire framework of international investment law than a protectionist in-
vestment policy.
There is little risk that foreign investors will suddenly engage in
some politically motivated action that interferes with defense produc-
tion in a crisis. If foreign investors attempt to close facilities or limit
production of important military materials in a crisis, the president
may seize control of the facilities and require continued production
under other existing law. In very rare cases, the threat an investment
poses to defense production may be great enough to override concerns
about the risk of damage to defense production resulting from the use
of Exon-Florio. The executive should view claims about the magnitude
of such threats with considerable skepticism. When other United States
law is adequate to protect a key industry, there is no reason for the
United States to resort to extraordinary measures such as Exon-Florio.
379. Grimes & Williams, supra note 208.
380. CoNF. REP., supra note 27, at 927.
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Since the passage of Exon-Florio, technology transfer issues have
supplanted defense production issues as the primary problem that the
government has sought to address through use of the provision. The
main concern is that a foreign company might gain access to militarily
or commercially significant technology through direct investment in
United States firms.38 1 Other existing law can handle most military
risks that might arise directly through the transfer of technology under
control of the acquired firm. Existing law does not adequately address
unique situations where foreign investors could use United States-based
firms as fronts for intelligence gathering operations and seek informa-
tion about critical military technology. 2 Many of the countries that
raise the greatest concerns about technology security are not parties to
free investment treaties. The government could use Exon-Florio in
these cases to prevent harmful technology transfers without running
afoul of international obligations.
Finally, the indeterminate language of the Exon-Florio Amendment
may serve a useful political purpose for Congress. Now that Congress
has authorized this power, presidents can no longer make excuses for
failing to take action against controversial foreign investments. Never-
theless, the failure of Congress to provide a definite standard for the
president to apply may have serious negative consequences for the
economy of the United States and for relations with other states. Con-
gress' failure to clearly articulate the purpose of this law leaves foreign
investors and governments uncertain about the policies underlying the
law and their implications. This reduces the force of international law
protecting free investment and may deter potential investors.
As a matter of policy, the United States government should attempt
to define national security with more precision than the legislative his-
tory provides. The definition should indicate that the government will
apply Exon-Florio in a manner consistent with the United States policy
of supporting an open international investment environment. It should
focus on minimizing the risks of erosion of the defense industrial base
and evaluate technology transfer and counter-intelligence issues that
particular investors raise. By phrasing this definition in terms of factors
that the government will consider rather than absolute directives, the
regulations can avoid limiting the president's ability to protect the na-
tional security in future unforseeable circumstances. At the same time,
following a policy that does not allow for arbitrary expansion of the
381. Exec. Order No. 12,661, 54 Fed. Reg. 784 (1989).




national security standard could allay concerns about governmental in-
terference with private transactions, increase international confidence
in United States securities, avoid reductions in beneficial investment
flows, decrease the probability that American-based firms will go out of
business, and strengthen the position of the United States in negotia-
tions that could help open the world's investment markets.
Exon-Florio provides the executive with new authority which fortui-
tously may prove useful in filling some finite loopholes in the legal
scheme preventing harmful technological exports and the degradation
of the defense industrial base. The Amendment also gives the president
additional methods of exerting diplomatic leverage in contexts where
precision in the application of sanctions may be advantageous. Unfortu-
nately, it also provides the power to restrict investment in economically
tough times when foreign firms may be politically useful scapegoats.
Over two years after its enactment, Exon-Florio remains a solution in
search of a problem. So long as its purposes remain so undefined, the
potential for its misuse in response to partisan electoral problems is as




Section 2170. Authority to Review Certain Mergers, Acquisitions, and
Takeovers
(a) Investigations
The President or the President's designee may make an investigation
to determine the effects on national security of mergers, acquisitions,
and takeovers proposed or pending after the date of enactment of this
section [Aug. 23, 1988] by or with foreign persons which could result
in foreign control of persons engaged in interstate commerce in the
United States. If it is determined that an investigation should be under-
taken, it shall commence no later than 30 days after receipt by the
President or the President's designee of written notification of the pro-
posed or pending merger, acquisition, or takeover as prescribed by reg-
ulations promulgated pursuant to this section. Such investigation shall
be completed no later than 45 days after such determination.
(b) Confidentiality of Information
Any information or documentary material filed with the President or
the President's designee pursuant to this section shall be exempt from
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disclosure under section 552 of title 5, United States Code, and no such
information or documentary material may be made public, except as
may be relevant to any administration or judicial action or proceeding.
Nothing in this subsection shall be construed to prevent disclosure to
either House of Congress or to any duly authorized committee or sub-
commitee of the Congress.
(c) Action by the President
Subject to subsection (d), the President may take such action for
such time as the President considers appropriate to suspend or prohibit
any acquisition, merger, or takeover, of a person engaged in interstate
commerce in the United States proposed or pending on or after the
date of enactment of this section by or with foreign persons so that
such control will not threaten to impair the national security. The Pres-
ident shall announce the decision to take action pursuant to this subsec-
tion not later than 15 days after the investigation described in subsec-
tion (a) is completed. The President may direct the Attorney General
to seek appropriate relief, including divestment relief, in the district
courts of the United States in order to implement and enforce this
section.
(d) Findings of the President
The President may exercise the authority conferred by subsection (c)
only if the President finds that-
(1) there is credible evidence that leads the President to believe that
the foreign interest exercising control might take action that threatens
to impair the national security, and
(2) provisions of law, other than this section and the International
Emergency Economic Powers Act (50 U.S.C. 1701-1706), do not in the
President's judgment provide adequate and appropriate authority for
the President to protect the national security in the matter before the
President. The provisions of subsection (d) of this section, shall not be
subject to judicial review.
(e) Factors to be Considered
For purposes of this section, the President or the President's designee
may, taking into account the requirements of national security, con-
sider among other factors-
(1) domestic production needed for projected national defense
requirements,
(2) the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet na-
tional defense requirements, including the availability of human re-
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sources, products, technology, materials, and other supplies and ser-
vices, and
(3) the control of domestic industries and commercial activity by for-
eign citizens as it affects the capability and capacity of the United
States to meet the requirements of national security.
(f) Report to the Congress
If the President determines to take action under subsection (c), the
President shall immediately transmit to the Secretary of the Senate
and the Clerk of the House of Representatives a written report of the
action which the President intends to take, including a detailed expla-
nation of the findings made under subsection (d).
(g) Regulations
The President shall direct the issuance of regulations to carry out
this section. Such regulations shall, to the extent possible, minimize
paperwork burdens and shall to the extent possible coordinate reporting
requirements under this section with reporting requirements under any
other provision of Federal law.
(h) Effect on Other Law
Nothing in this section shall be construed to alter or affect any ex-
isting power, process, regulation, investigation, enforcement measure,
or review provided by any other provision of law.
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